On Participation Games with Complete Information
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References listed on IDEAS
- Palfrey, Thomas R. & Rosenthal, Howard, 1984.
"Participation and the provision of discrete public goods: a strategic analysis,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 171-193, July.
- Palfrey, Thomas & Rosenthal, Howard., 1983. "Participation and the Provision of Discrete Public Goods: A Strategic Analysi," Working Papers 465, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Govindan, Srihari & Reny, Philip J. & Robson, Arthur J., 2003. "A short proof of Harsanyi's purification theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 369-374, November.
- Francesco Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2005.
"On the generic strategic stability of Nash equilibria if voting is costly,"
Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 25(2), pages 477-486, February.
- De Sinopoli, Francesco & Iannantuoni, Giovanna, 2002. "On the generic strategic stability of nash equilibria if voting is costly," UC3M Working papers. Economics we025620, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
- Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2003. "On the Generic Strategic Stability of Nash Equilibria if Voting is Costly," CEIS Research Paper 41, Tor Vergata University, CEIS.
- Timothy J. Feddersen, 2004. "Rational Choice Theory and the Paradox of Not Voting," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 18(1), pages 99-112, Winter.
- repec:cup:apsrev:v:79:y:1985:i:01:p:62-78_22 is not listed on IDEAS
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KeywordsTurnout; Public Goods; Regular Equilibrium; Monotone Equilibrium.;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-11-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2005-11-05 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2005-11-05 (Microeconomics)
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