The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information
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- Nöldeke, Georg & Peña, Jorge, 2016. "The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 71-81.
- Nöldeke, Georg & Peña, Jorge, 2016. "The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145647, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Nöldeke, Georg & Peña, Jorge, 2015. "The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information," Working papers 2015/08, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
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More about this item
Keywords
costly voting; mixed strategy equilibrium; participation games; polynomials in Bernstein form;JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2015-08-13 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2015-08-13 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2015-08-13 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2015-08-13 (Microeconomics)
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