IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/matsoc/v138y2025ics0165489625000861.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The set of pure-strategy equilibria in max–min two-group contests with a private good prize

Author

Listed:
  • Gilli, Mario
  • Sorrentino, Andrea

Abstract

We characterize the set of pure-strategy equilibria in a deterministic group contest with the weakest-link impact function and a private good prize, complementing the results obtained by Lee (2012) and Chowdhury et al. (2016). We consider a two-stage two-group model, where in the first stage the agents simultaneously choose the sharing rule, while in the second stage they choose efforts. We find that there are continua of subgame perfect equilibria, which means that in equilibrium players’ behavior is indeterminate. By additional restrictions on the effort levels of each class of effort equilibria, we are able to computationally characterize the set of subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies.

Suggested Citation

  • Gilli, Mario & Sorrentino, Andrea, 2025. "The set of pure-strategy equilibria in max–min two-group contests with a private good prize," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 138(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:138:y:2025:i:c:s0165489625000861
    DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102471
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489625000861
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102471?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:138:y:2025:i:c:s0165489625000861. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.