A Multi-winner Nested Rent-Seeking Contest
This paper considers a symmetric imperfectly discriminating rent-seeking contest in which there may be several winners. The authors first demonstrate a serious flaw in previous work and then go on to suggest an alternative method for analyzing the contest. In contrast to the previous work, they show that the value of the rent is fully dissipated in equilibrium as the number of players becomes large. Copyright 1996 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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