Endogenous Sharing Rules in Collective-Group Rent-Seeking
This paper examines the possibility of endogenous determination of intra-group sharing rules in a collective-group rent-seeking game. Collective-group rent-seeking is considered as a two-stage Nash-Cournot game in which sharing rules are determined prior to individual decision on voluntary contribution. The solution is subgame perfect and is obtained by backward induction. In competition between two groups of the same size, the Nash equilibrium sharing rule of each group is to distribute rent to each according to relative effort. Total rent-seeking outlays in this case are equal to those obtained by Tullock (1980). When more than two groups compete for a rent, the sharing rule based on relative effort is again likely to be the Nash equilibrium strategy of each group. The amount of total rent-seeking outlays is also equal to that in Tullock (1980). In a nutshell, the rent is substantially dissipated if sharing rules are endogenously determined. Copyright 1995 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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