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Oligopolization in collective rent-seeking

  • Kaoru Ueda

    ()

    (Faculty of Economics, Nanzan University, 18 Yamazato-cho Showa-ku, Nagoya, Aichi 466-8673, Japan)

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    In this paper we discuss the issue of when oligopolization in collective rent-seeking occurs, that is, when some groups retire from rent-seeking. A complete characterization of the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in a collective rent-seeking game among m (\geq2) heterogeneous groups is derived. The conditions of oligopolization are derived by using this result and related to the works of Nitzan [9, 10] and Hillman and Riley [3]. Also, the subgame perfect equilibrium of a simple two-stage collective rent-seeking game (Lee [7]) is fully characterized. In this game, it is confirmed that no group retires from the contest in the second stage and oligopolization never occurs. An example of the two-stage collective rent-seeking game with monitoring costs is devised to show the possibilities of oligopolization.

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    Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

    Volume (Year): 19 (2002)
    Issue (Month): 3 ()
    Pages: 613-626

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    Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:19:y:2002:i:3:p:613-626
    Note: Received: 21 September 1999/Accepted: 27 March 2001 received very helpful comments from Debraj Ray. All remaining errors are my responsibility.-->
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