Core Deviation Minimizing Auctions
We study dominant strategy implementable direct mechanisms that minimize the expected surplus from core deviations. Using incentive compatibility conditions, we formulate the core deviation miminimization problem as a calculus of variations problem and then numerically solve it for some particular cases
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- Ott, Marion & Beck, Marissa, 2013. "Incentives for Overbidding in Minimum-Revenue Core-Selecting Auctions," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79946, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Robert W. Day & S. Raghavan, 2007. "Fair Payments for Efficient Allocations in Public Sector Combinatorial Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 53(9), pages 1389-1406, September.
- Paul Klemperer & Aytek Erdil, 2009.
"A New Payment Rule for Core-Selecting Package Auctions,"
Economics Series Working Papers
2009-W11, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Aytek Erdil & Paul Klemperer, 2010. "A New Payment Rule for Core-Selecting Package Auctions," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 8(2-3), pages 537-547, 04-05.
- Erdil, Aytek & Klemperer, Paul, 2009. "A New Payment Rule for Core-Selecting Package Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 7487, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Aytek Erdil & Paul Klemperer, 2009. "A New Payment Rule for Core-Selecting Package Auctions," Economics Papers 2009-W11, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
- Lawrence M. Ausubel & Paul Milgrom, 2002.
"Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding,"
02004, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
- Robert Day & Paul Milgrom, 2008. "Core-selecting package auctions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 393-407, March.
- Peter Cramton, 2009.
"Spectrum Auction Design,"
Papers of Peter Cramton
09sad, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2012.
- Marshall, Robert C. & Marx, Leslie M., 2007. "Bidder collusion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 374-402, March.
- Sano, Ryuji, 2011. "Incentives in core-selecting auctions with single-minded bidders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 602-606, June.
- Laurent Lamy, 2010. "Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 39(3), pages 503-510, July.
- Robert Day & Peter Cramton, 2008. "Quadratic Core-Selecting Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 08qcspr, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2012.
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