Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity
Day and Milgrom (Int J Game Theory 36:393-407, 2008) argue that package auctions that select the seller's minimum revenue in the Core are revenue-monotone. We show that no bidder-optimal Core-selecting auction can satisfy revenue-monotonicity for general preferences when there are at least three goods for sale, while the property holds for any bidder-optimal Core-selecting auction in environments with only two goods or if the characteristic function is submodular.
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Volume (Year): 39 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
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- Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Paul Milgrom, 2004.
"The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design,"
Papers of Peter Cramton
04mit5, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2004.
- Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Crampton & Paul Milgrom, 2004. "The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design," Discussion Papers 03-034, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
- Robert Day & Paul Milgrom, 2008. "Core-selecting package auctions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 393-407, March.
- Lawrence M. Ausubel & Paul Milgrom, 2002.
"Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding,"
02004, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
- Bikhchandani, Sushil & Ostroy, Joseph M., 2002. "The Package Assignment Model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 377-406, December.
- Robert W. Day & S. Raghavan, 2007. "Fair Payments for Efficient Allocations in Public Sector Combinatorial Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 53(9), pages 1389-1406, September.
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