IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/reecde/v29y2025i2d10.1007_s10058-024-00354-0.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Robust auctions with affiliated private values

Author

Listed:
  • Yangwei Song

    (University of Colorado Boulder)

Abstract

We study auctions in an affiliated private value framework in which buyers face ambiguity over the distribution of the others’ valuations and make choices that are robust to that ambiguity. We show that, in contrast to the Bayesian case, a first-price auction can generate a higher revenue than a second-price auction in the presence of ambiguity. We also extend this insight to large double auctions. In particular, we propose a pay-as-bid double auction mechanism and demonstrate that given any nontrivial amount of ambiguity, this mechanism implements the efficient trade and is ex-post budget balanced with probability one as the market size grows.

Suggested Citation

  • Yangwei Song, 2025. "Robust auctions with affiliated private values," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 29(2), pages 245-279, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:29:y:2025:i:2:d:10.1007_s10058-024-00354-0
    DOI: 10.1007/s10058-024-00354-0
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10058-024-00354-0
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10058-024-00354-0?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Linkage principle; Affiliation; Ambiguity aversion;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:29:y:2025:i:2:d:10.1007_s10058-024-00354-0. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.