Individual Rationality Under Sequential Decentralized Participation Processes
We consider the implementation of an economic outcome undercomplete information when the principal cannot commit to a simultaneousparticipation game. From a general class of sequential decentralizedparticipation processes and without common knowledge onthe details of the process, we introduce the concept of implementationunder robust sequential individual rationality. We solve the optimaldesign program: the principal may fail to extract fully agents' surplusrelative to the harsher threats but economic eciency is not damaged.
|Date of creation:||2007|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 15 Boulevard Gabriel Peri 92245 Malakoff Cedex|
Phone: 01 41 17 60 81
Web page: http://www.crest.fr
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:crs:wpaper:2007-28. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Florian Sallaberry)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.