A binary conflict ascending price (BICAP) mechanism for the decentralized allocation of the right to use railroad tracks
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- Plott, Charles R., .
"Market Architectures, Institutional Landscapes and Testbed Experiments,"
866, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Plott, Charles R, 1994. "Market Architectures, Institutional Landscapes and Testbed Experiments," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 3-10, January.
- S.J. Rassenti & V.L. Smith & R.L. Bulfin, 1982. "A Combinatorial Auction Mechanism for Airport Time Slot Allocation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 402-417, Autumn.
- Jeffrey S. Banks & John O. Ledyard & David P. Porter, 1989. "Allocating Uncertain and Unresponsive Resources: An Experimental Approach," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(1), pages 1-25, Spring.
- Rassenti, Stephen J & Reynolds, Stanley S & Smith, Vernon L, 1994. "Cotenancy and Competition in an Experimental Auction Market for Natural Gas Pipeline Networks," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 41-65, January.
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