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Combinatorial Auctions for Transportation Service Procurement: The Carrier Perspective

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  • Regan, A C
  • Song, Jiongjiong

Abstract

The procurement of transportation services is an important task for shippers because of the need to control costs at the same time as providing high service levels. When shippers with goods and/or materials to transport seek transportation services from outside companies they typically put out a request for quotes from a set of carriers. They then assign contracts based on negotiated service charges. This process is similar to a simple sealed-bid auction in which each bidder submits a sealed bid for a single item. In the past, when shippers need to procure transportation services for a set of distinctive delivery routes (called lanes) they would obtain quotes for each lane individually and repeat the simple auction process for each lane. Alternatively, they might negotiate for bundles of lanes with a single carrier at a time. However, in the last few years software has been developed to allow shippers to make all lanes available for bidding simultaneously and to allow carriers to simultaneously bid upon combinations of individual lanes. This method of awarding contracts, conventionally called a combinatorial auction, has been reported to result in significant cost savings for shippers. Our research examines the benefits of combinatorial auctions primarily from the carrier's perspective. Preliminary findings, based on a simple simulation model suggest that benefits for carriers can also be significant.

Suggested Citation

  • Regan, A C & Song, Jiongjiong, 2003. "Combinatorial Auctions for Transportation Service Procurement: The Carrier Perspective," University of California Transportation Center, Working Papers qt7sq003mj, University of California Transportation Center.
  • Handle: RePEc:cdl:uctcwp:qt7sq003mj
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    1. Hammami, Farouk & Rekik, Monia & Coelho, Leandro C., 2019. "Exact and heuristic solution approaches for the bid construction problem in transportation procurement auctions with a heterogeneous fleet," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 150-177.
    2. Qiu, Xiaoqiu & Feuerriegel, Stefan & Neumann, Dirk, 2017. "Making the most of fleets: A profit-maximizing multi-vehicle pickup and delivery selection problem," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 259(1), pages 155-168.
    3. Garrido, Rodrigo A., 2007. "Procurement of transportation services in spot markets under a double-auction scheme with elastic demand," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 41(9), pages 1067-1078, November.
    4. Okan Örsan Özener & Özlem Ergun & Martin Savelsbergh, 2011. "Lane-Exchange Mechanisms for Truckload Carrier Collaboration," Transportation Science, INFORMS, vol. 45(1), pages 1-17, February.
    5. Mochon, Pablo & Mochon, Asuncion & Saez, Yago, 2022. "Combinatorial versus sequential auctions to allocate PPP highway projects," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 23-39.
    6. Hammami, Farouk & Rekik, Monia & Coelho, Leandro C., 2021. "Exact and hybrid heuristic methods to solve the combinatorial bid construction problem with stochastic prices in truckload transportation services procurement auctions," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 204-229.
    7. Pueboobpaphan, Suthatip & Indra-Payoong, Nakorn & Opasanon, Sathaporn, 2019. "Experimental analysis of variable surcharge policy of taxi service auction," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 134-148.
    8. van Duin, J.H.R. & Tavasszy, L.A. & Taniguchi, E., 2007. "Real time simulation of auctioning and re-scheduling processes in hybrid freight markets," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 41(9), pages 1050-1066, November.
    9. Jothi Basu, R. & Bai, Ruibin & Palaniappan, PL.K., 2015. "A strategic approach to improve sustainability in transportation service procurement," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 152-168.
    10. Huang, George Q. & Xu, Su Xiu, 2013. "Truthful multi-unit transportation procurement auctions for logistics e-marketplaces," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 127-148.
    11. Lafkihi, Mariam & Pan, Shenle & Ballot, Eric, 2019. "Freight transportation service procurement: A literature review and future research opportunities in omnichannel E-commerce," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 348-365.
    12. Lindsey, Christopher & Mahmassani, Hani S., 2017. "Sourcing truckload capacity in the transportation spot market: A framework for third party providers," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 261-273.
    13. Pittawat Ueasangkomsate & Manoj Lohatepanont, 2012. "Bidding Strategies for Carrier in Combinatorial Transportation Auction," International Journal of Business Research and Management (IJBRM), Computer Science Journals (CSC Journals), vol. 3(1), pages 1-17, February.
    14. Xu, Su Xiu & Huang, George Q., 2013. "Transportation service procurement in periodic sealed double auctions with stochastic demand and supply," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 136-160.
    15. Mesa-Arango, Rodrigo & Ukkusuri, Satish V., 2013. "Benefits of in-vehicle consolidation in less than truckload freight transportation operations," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 113-125.
    16. Zolfagharinia, Hossein & Haughton, Michael A., 2017. "Operational flexibility in the truckload trucking industry," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 437-460.
    17. Song, Jiongjiong & Regan, A C, 2003. "Approximation Algorithms for the Bid Construction Problem in Combinatorial Auctions for the Procurement of Freight Transportation Contracts," University of California Transportation Center, Working Papers qt3j7034z2, University of California Transportation Center.
    18. R. Jothi Basu & Nachiappan Subramanian & Angappa Gunasekaran & P. L. K. Palaniappan, 2017. "Influence of non-price and environmental sustainability factors on truckload procurement process," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 250(2), pages 363-388, March.
    19. Mesa-Arango, Rodrigo & Ukkusuri, Satish V., 2015. "Demand clustering in freight logistics networks," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 36-51.

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