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Approximation Algorithms for the Bid Construction Problem in Combinatorial Auctions for the Procurement of Freight Transportation Contracts

  • Song, Jiongjiong
  • Regan, A C
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    The bid valuation and construction problem for carriers facing combinatorial auctions for the procurement of freight transportation contracts is very difficult and involves the computation of a number of NP-hard sub problems. In this paper we examine computationally tractable approximation methods for estimating these values and constructing bids. The benefit of our approximation method is that it provides a way for carriers to construct optimal or near optimal bids by solving a single NP-hard problem. This represents a significant improvement in efficiency. In addition, this method can be extended to many other applications.

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    File URL: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/3j7034z2.pdf;origin=repeccitec
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    Paper provided by University of California Transportation Center in its series University of California Transportation Center, Working Papers with number qt3j7034z2.

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    Date of creation: 01 Jan 2003
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    Handle: RePEc:cdl:uctcwp:qt3j7034z2
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    1. Bykowsky, Mark M & Cull, Robert J & Ledyard, John O, 2000. "Mutually Destructive Bidding: The FCC Auction Design Problem," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 205-28, May.
    2. Ledyard, John O. & Olson, Mark & Porter, David & Swanson, Joseph A. & Torma, David P., 2000. "The First Use of a Combined Value Auction for Transportation Services," Working Papers 1093, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    3. S.J. Rassenti & V.L. Smith & R.L. Bulfin, 1982. "A Combinatorial Auction Mechanism for Airport Time Slot Allocation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 402-417, Autumn.
    4. Anthony M. Kwasnica & John O. Ledyard & Dave Porter & Christine DeMartini, 2005. "A New and Improved Design for Multiobject Iterative Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(3), pages 419-434, March.
    5. Regan, A C & Song, Jiongjiong, 2003. "Combinatorial Auctions for Transportation Service Procurement: The Carrier Perspective," University of California Transportation Center, Working Papers qt7sq003mj, University of California Transportation Center.
    6. Michael H. Rothkopf & Aleksandar Peke\v{c} & Ronald M. Harstad, 1998. "Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 44(8), pages 1131-1147, August.
    7. Babaioff, Moshe & Feldman, Michal & Nisan, Noam & Winter, Eyal, 2012. "Combinatorial agency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(3), pages 999-1034.
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