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On the Number and Heterogeneity of Bidders in Livestock Auctions

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  • Bruno Larue
  • Sébastien Pouliot
  • Mohamed Jeddy

Abstract

type="main" xml:lang="fr"> Nous démontrons que le revenu généré par une enchère d'animaux peut augmenter ou diminuer avec le nombre d'enchérisseurs et ce, que le nouvel enchérisseur gagne ou pas un objet. Des enchérisseurs additionnels qui s'approvisionnent principalement d'autres sources peuvent avoir un effet encore plus négatif sur les prix. Nous exploitons des données de l'enchère journalière du porc au Québec pour analyser l'addition d'enchérisseurs sur les prix. Les variations dans le nombre d'enchérisseurs sont le résultat d'entrées et sorties de transformateurs québécois et d'invitations sporadiques à des transformateurs ontariens. Nos résultats empiriques indiquent que l'entrée de transformateurs québécois a eu une influence positive sur les prix mais que la participation de transformateurs ontariens n'a pas eu d'effets significatifs.

Suggested Citation

  • Bruno Larue & Sébastien Pouliot & Mohamed Jeddy, 2016. "On the Number and Heterogeneity of Bidders in Livestock Auctions," Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie, Canadian Agricultural Economics Society/Societe canadienne d'agroeconomie, vol. 64(2), pages 289-310, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:canjag:v:64:y:2016:i:2:p:289-310
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    References listed on IDEAS

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