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Multi-Unit Auctions In The Procurement Of Electricity

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  • Dejan Trifunović
  • Bojan Ristić

Abstract

This paper reviews some multi-unit auction mechanisms that are used in the procurement of electricity. In ordinary multi-unit auctions bidders compete to buy several units of the same object from the seller, while in procurement or reverse auctions suppliers of electricity compete to sell a certain number of units. Reverse electricity auctions are used in numerous countries and they create a competitive market for electricity, instead of state-owned monopolies providing electricity at administratively set prices. In this paper we will present the most commonly used multi-unit auction forms in electricity markets. Auctions for electricity from renewable energy sources deserve special attention, since these suppliers cannot compete with large-scale producers at the present state of technology.

Suggested Citation

  • Dejan Trifunović & Bojan Ristić, 2013. "Multi-Unit Auctions In The Procurement Of Electricity," Economic Annals, Faculty of Economics, University of Belgrade, vol. 58(197), pages 47-78, April – J.
  • Handle: RePEc:beo:journl:v:58:y:2013:i:197:p:47-78
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    File URL: http://ea.ekof.bg.ac.rs/pdf/197/03.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Dejan Trifunovic, 2014. "Sequential Auctions And Price Anomalies," Economic Annals, Faculty of Economics, University of Belgrade, vol. 59(200), pages 7-42, January –.
    2. Dejan Trifunović & Đorđe Mitrović, 2016. "Price Discrimination, Entry, And Switching Costs In Network Competition," Economic Annals, Faculty of Economics, University of Belgrade, vol. 61(209), pages 129-160, April - J.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Electricity auctions; Uniform-price auction; Discriminatory auction; Descending clock auction; Hybrid auctions; Sequential auctions; Combinatorial auctions.;

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement

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