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Notes and Comments the Amsterdam Auction


  • Jacob K. Goeree
  • Theo Offerman


The Amsterdam auction has been used to sell real estate in the Dutch capital for centuries. By awarding a premium to the highest losing bidder, the Amsterdam auction favors weak bidders without having the implementation difficulties of Myerson's (1981) optimal auction. In a series of experiments, we compare the standard first-price and English auctions, the optimal auction, and two variants of the Amsterdam auction. With strongly asymmetric bidders, the second-price Amsterdam auction raises substantially more revenues than standard formats and only slightly less than the optimal auction. Copyright Econometric Society 2004.

Suggested Citation

  • Jacob K. Goeree & Theo Offerman, 2004. "Notes and Comments the Amsterdam Auction," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(1), pages 281-294, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:72:y:2004:i:1:p:281-294

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    1. repec:kap:jrefec:v:56:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s11146-016-9594-8 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Brunner, Christoph & Hu, Audrey & Oechssler, Jörg, 2014. "Premium auctions and risk preferences: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 467-484.
    3. Georganas, Sotiris & Kagel, John, 2011. "Asymmetric auctions with resale: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 359-371, January.
    4. Vincent van den Berg, 2013. "Over- and Under-Bidding in Tendering," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 13-033/VIII, Tinbergen Institute.
    5. Vincent van den Berg, 2012. "Advantaged Bidders in Franchise Auctions," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-117/VIII, Tinbergen Institute.
    6. Peyman Khezr & Flavio Menezes, 2015. "Auctions with an asking price," Discussion Papers Series 539, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
    7. Bernard Lebrun, 2015. "Revenue-superior variants of the second-price auction," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 59(2), pages 245-275, June.
    8. Dejan Trifunović & Bojan Ristić, 2013. "Multi-Unit Auctions In The Procurement Of Electricity," Economic Annals, Faculty of Economics, University of Belgrade, vol. 58(197), pages 47-78, April – J.
    9. Hu, Audrey & Offerman, Theo & Zou, Liang, 2011. "Premium auctions and risk preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(6), pages 2420-2439.
    10. Lamy, Laurent, 2009. "The Shill Bidding Effect versus the Linkage Principle," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 390-413, January.
    11. Bartling, Björn & Netzer, Nick, 2016. "An externality-robust auction: Theory and experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 186-204.
    12. Vincent A.C. van den Berg, 2013. "Tender Auctions with Existing Operators Bidding," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 13-117/VIII, Tinbergen Institute.
    13. Hu, Audrey & Offerman, Theo & Onderstal, Sander, 2011. "Fighting collusion in auctions: An experimental investigation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 84-96, January.
    14. Lu, Jingfeng, 2012. "Optimal auctions with asymmetric financial externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 561-575.

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