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Putting renewable energy auctions into action – An agent-based model of onshore wind power auctions in Germany

Author

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  • Anatolitis, Vasilios
  • Welisch, Marijke

Abstract

The following analysis looks into auctions for renewable energy, specifically onshore wind power in Germany. Following an agent-based modeling approach, the two most commonly applied auction pricing rules are compared (uniform and pay-as-bid) and first conclusions on outcomes are drawn for future policy design. The auctions are modeled to closely represent the auction design foreseen in the German Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG, 2017) and replicate their parameters.

Suggested Citation

  • Anatolitis, Vasilios & Welisch, Marijke, 2017. "Putting renewable energy auctions into action – An agent-based model of onshore wind power auctions in Germany," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 394-402.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:enepol:v:110:y:2017:i:c:p:394-402
    DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2017.08.024
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    References listed on IDEAS

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