IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/enepol/v37y2009i10p4132-4144.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

An agent-based analysis of the German electricity market with transmission capacity constraints

Author

Listed:
  • Veit, Daniel J.
  • Weidlich, Anke
  • Krafft, Jacob A.

Abstract

While some agent-based models have been developed for analyzing the German electricity market, there has been little research done on the emerging issue of intra-German congestion and its effects on the bidding behavior of generator agents. Yet, studies of other markets have shown that transmission grid constraints considerably affect strategic behavior in electricity markets. In this paper, the implications of transmission constraints on power markets are analyzed for the case of Germany. Market splitting is applied in the case of congestion in the grid. For this purpose, the agent-based modeling of electricity systems (AMES) market package developed by Sun and Tesfatsion is modified to fit the German context, including a detailed representation of the German high-voltage grid and its interconnections. Implications of transmission constraints on prices and social welfare are analyzed for scenarios that include strategic behavior of market participants and high wind power generation. It can be shown that strategic behavior and transmission constraints are inter-related and may pose severe problems in the future German electricity market.

Suggested Citation

  • Veit, Daniel J. & Weidlich, Anke & Krafft, Jacob A., 2009. "An agent-based analysis of the German electricity market with transmission capacity constraints," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(10), pages 4132-4144, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:enepol:v:37:y:2009:i:10:p:4132-4144
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301-4215(09)00331-0
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Paul L. Joskow, 2001. "California's Electricity Crisis," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 17(3), pages 365-388.
    2. Erev, Ido & Roth, Alvin E, 1998. "Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 848-881, September.
    3. Brunekreeft, Gert & Neuhoff, Karsten & Newbery, David, 2005. "Electricity transmission: An overview of the current debate," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 73-93, June.
    4. Weidlich, Anke & Veit, Daniel, 2008. "A critical survey of agent-based wholesale electricity market models," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 1728-1759, July.
    5. Weidlich Anke & Veit Daniel, 2008. "Agent-Based Simulations for Electricity Market Regulation Advice: Procedures and an Example," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 228(2-3), pages 149-172, April.
    6. Hurlbut, David & Rogas, Keith & Oren, Shmuel, 2004. "Protecting the Market from "Hockey Stick" Pricing: How the Public Utility Commission of Texas is Dealing with Potential Price Gouging," The Electricity Journal, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 26-33, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. van Blijswijk, Martti J. & de Vries, Laurens J., 2012. "Evaluating congestion management in the Dutch electricity transmission grid," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 916-926.
    2. Li, Gong & Shi, Jing, 2012. "Agent-based modeling for trading wind power with uncertainty in the day-ahead wholesale electricity markets of single-sided auctions," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 13-22.
    3. Liu, Beibei & He, Pan & Zhang, Bing & Bi, Jun, 2012. "Impacts of alternative allowance allocation methods under a cap-and-trade program in power sector," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 405-415.
    4. Aliabadi, Danial Esmaeili & Kaya, Murat & Şahin, Güvenç, 2017. "An agent-based simulation of power generation company behavior in electricity markets under different market-clearing mechanisms," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 191-205.
    5. Young, David & Poletti, Stephen & Browne, Oliver, 2014. "Can agent-based models forecast spot prices in electricity markets? Evidence from the New Zealand electricity market," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 419-434.
    6. Li, Gong & Shi, Jing & Qu, Xiuli, 2011. "Modeling methods for GenCo bidding strategy optimization in the liberalized electricity spot market–A state-of-the-art review," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 36(8), pages 4686-4700.
    7. Rahimiyan, Morteza, 2014. "A statistical cognitive model to assess impact of spatially correlated wind production on market behaviors," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 62-72.
    8. Block, C. & Collins, J. & Ketter, W. & Weinhardt, C., 2009. "A Multi-Agent Energy Trading Competition," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2009-054-LIS, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
    9. Yousefi, Shaghayegh & Moghaddam, Mohsen Parsa & Majd, Vahid Johari, 2011. "Optimal real time pricing in an agent-based retail market using a comprehensive demand response model," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 36(9), pages 5716-5727.
    10. repec:gam:jsusta:v:9:y:2017:i:8:p:1318-:d:106509 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Liu, Zhen & Zhang, Xiliang & Lieu, Jenny, 2010. "Design of the incentive mechanism in electricity auction market based on the signaling game theory," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 1813-1819.
    12. repec:eee:enepol:v:110:y:2017:i:c:p:394-402 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. repec:eee:appene:v:195:y:2017:i:c:p:1000-1011 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. repec:gam:jeners:v:10:y:2017:i:12:p:2045-:d:121412 is not listed on IDEAS

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:enepol:v:37:y:2009:i:10:p:4132-4144. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/enpol .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.