An agent-based analysis of the German electricity market with transmission capacity constraints
While some agent-based models have been developed for analyzing the German electricity market, there has been little research done on the emerging issue of intra-German congestion and its effects on the bidding behavior of generator agents. Yet, studies of other markets have shown that transmission grid constraints considerably affect strategic behavior in electricity markets. In this paper, the implications of transmission constraints on power markets are analyzed for the case of Germany. Market splitting is applied in the case of congestion in the grid. For this purpose, the agent-based modeling of electricity systems (AMES) market package developed by Sun and Tesfatsion is modified to fit the German context, including a detailed representation of the German high-voltage grid and its interconnections. Implications of transmission constraints on prices and social welfare are analyzed for scenarios that include strategic behavior of market participants and high wind power generation. It can be shown that strategic behavior and transmission constraints are inter-related and may pose severe problems in the future German electricity market.
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