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When Speed is of Essence: Perishable Goods Auctions

Author

Listed:
  • Isa Hafalir

    (University of Technology Sydney)

  • Onur Kesten

    (University of Sydney)

  • Katerina Sherstyuk

    (University of Hawaii at Manoa)

  • Cong Tao

    (University of Technology Sydney)

Abstract

We study a remarkable auction used in several fish markets around the world, notably in Honolulu and Sydney, whereby high-quality fish are sold fast through a hybrid auction that combines the Dutch and the English formats in one auction. Speedy sales are of essence for these perishable goods. Our theoretical model incorporating Òtime costsÓ demonstrates that such Honolulu-Sydney auction is preferred by the auctioneer over the Dutch auction when there are few bidders or when bidders have high time costs. Our laboratory experiments confirm that with a small number of bidders, Honolulu-Sydney auctions are significantly faster than Dutch auctions. Bidders overbid in Dutch, benefiting the auctioneer, but bidding approaches risk-neutral predictions as time costs increase. Bidders fare better in the Honolulu-Sydney format compared to Dutch across all treatments. We further observe bidder attempts to tacitly lower prices in Honolulu- Sydney auctions, substantiating existing concerns about pricing in some fish markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Isa Hafalir & Onur Kesten & Katerina Sherstyuk & Cong Tao, 2025. "When Speed is of Essence: Perishable Goods Auctions," Working Papers 202502, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hai:wpaper:202502
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    File URL: http://www.economics.hawaii.edu/research/workingpapers/WP_25-02R.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2025
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    auction theory; time costs; laboratory experiments;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • L0 - Industrial Organization - - General

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