Supply Function Equilibria of Pay-as-Bid Auctions
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More about this item
KeywordsSupply Function Equilibrium; Pay-as-bid Auction; Discriminatory Auction; Divisible;
- C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-06-10 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-2009-06-10 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2009-06-10 (Game Theory)
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