IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/jogath/v33y2004i1p89-106.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Declining valuations in sequential auctions

Author

Listed:
  • Thomas Kittsteiner

    ()

  • Jörg Nikutta
  • Eyal Winter

Abstract

We analyze an independent private values model where a number of objects are sold in sequential first- and second-price auctions. Bidders have unit demand and their valuation for an object is decreasing in the rank number of the auction in which it is sold. We derive efficient equilibria if prices are announced after each auction or if no information is given to bidders. We show that the sequence of prices constitutes a supermartingale. Even if we correct for the decrease in valuations for objects sold in later auctions we find that average prices are declining. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas Kittsteiner & Jörg Nikutta & Eyal Winter, 2004. "Declining valuations in sequential auctions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 33(1), pages 89-106, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:33:y:2004:i:1:p:89-106
    DOI: 10.1007/s001820400186
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s001820400186
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Bruno Larue & Mohamed Jeddy & Sébastien Pouliot, 2013. "On the Number of Bidders and Auction Performance: when More Means Less," Cahiers de recherche CREATE 2013-4, CREATE.
    2. Said, Maher, 2012. "Auctions with dynamic populations: Efficiency and revenue maximization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(6), pages 2419-2438.
    3. Muramoto, Akitoshi & Sano, Ryuji, 2016. "Sequential auctions of heterogeneous objects," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 49-51.
    4. Paul Schweinzer, 2008. "Labour market recruiting with intermediaries," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 12(2), pages 119-127, June.
    5. Schweinzer, Paul, 2006. "Labour market screening with intermediaries," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 138, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    6. Kannan, Karthik N., 2010. "Declining prices in sequential auctions with complete revelation of bids," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 49-51, July.
    7. Said, Maher, 2008. "Information Revelation and Random Entry in Sequential Ascending Auctions," MPRA Paper 7160, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    D82; D44; sequential auctions; declining valuations; price decline; martingale property;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:33:y:2004:i:1:p:89-106. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.