Declining prices in sequential auctions with complete revelation of bids
In a sequential-auction setting, the expected-winning prices are shown to decline across two stages when all bids are revealed between the stages. The prices decline because bidders desire to hide their private valuation information. The hiding also leads to inefficient allocations.
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829, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
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