IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/ecinqu/v40y2002i3p403-414.html

Scale Economies and the Dynamics of Recurring Auctions

Author

Listed:
  • Thomas D. Jeitschko

    (Department of Economics, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824.)

  • Elmar Wolfstetter

    (Institut f. Wirtschaftstheorie I, Humboldt-Universit”t zu Berlin, Spandauer Str. 1, 10178 Berlin, Germany.)

Abstract

We analyze the dynamics of a game of sequential bidding in the presence of stochastic scale effects, either economies or diseconomies of scale. We show that economies of scale give rise to declining expected equilibrium prices, whereas the converse is not generally true. Moreover, first- and second-price auctions are not always revenue equivalent. Economies of scale make second-price auctions more profitable for the seller, whereas revenue equivalence may be preserved in the case of diseconomies. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas D. Jeitschko & Elmar Wolfstetter, 2002. "Scale Economies and the Dynamics of Recurring Auctions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 40(3), pages 403-414, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:40:y:2002:i:3:p:403-414
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a
    for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:40:y:2002:i:3:p:403-414. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/weaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.