Declining Valuations in Sequential Auctions
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- Said, Maher, 2012.
"Auctions with dynamic populations: Efficiency and revenue maximization,"
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Elsevier, vol. 147(6), pages 2419-2438.
- Said, Maher, 2008. "Auctions with Dynamic Populations: Efficiency and Revenue Maximization," MPRA Paper 11456, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Bruno Larue & Mohamed Jeddy & Sébastien Pouliot, 2013.
"On the Number of Bidders and Auction Performance: when More Means Less,"
Cahiers de recherche CREATE
- Larue, Bruno & Jeddy, Mohamed & Pouliot, Sébastien, 2013. "On The Number Of Bidders And Auction Performance: When More Means Less," Working Papers 156465, Structure and Performance of Agriculture and Agri-products Industry (SPAA).
- Schweinzer, Paul, 2006. "Labour market screening with intermediaries," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 138, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Kannan, Karthik N., 2010. "Declining prices in sequential auctions with complete revelation of bids," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 49-51, July.
- Said, Maher, 2008. "Information Revelation and Random Entry in Sequential Ascending Auctions," MPRA Paper 7160, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Muramoto, Akitoshi & Sano, Ryuji, 2016. "Sequential auctions of heterogeneous objects," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 49-51.
- Paul Schweinzer, 2008. "Labour market recruiting with intermediaries," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 12(2), pages 119-127, June.
More about this item
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-07-03 (All new papers)
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