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The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont

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  • Daniel McFadden, 2009. "The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 13(1), pages 77-100, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:13:y:2009:i:1:p:77-100
    DOI: 10.1007/s10058-009-0075-x
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    Cited by:

    1. Magnac, Thierry, 2018. "Quels étudiants pour quelles universités ? Analyses empiriques de mécanismes d'allocation centralisée," TSE Working Papers 18-899, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    2. Klaus Heine, 2013. "Inside the black box: incentive regulation and incentive channeling on energy markets," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 17(1), pages 157-186, February.
    3. Stephen V. Burks & Erin L. Krupka, 2012. "A Multimethod Approach to Identifying Norms and Normative Expectations Within a Corporate Hierarchy: Evidence from the Financial Services Industry," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 58(1), pages 203-217, January.
    4. Banerjee, Prasenjit & Shogren, Jason F., 2012. "Material interests, moral reputation, and crowding out species protection on private land," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 137-149.
    5. Yusufcan Masatlioglu & Sarah Taylor & Neslihan Uler, 2012. "Behavioral mechanism design: evidence from the modified first-price auctions," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 16(2), pages 159-173, September.
    6. McFadden, Daniel, 2012. "Economic juries and public project provision," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 166(1), pages 116-126.
    7. Daske, Thomas, 2017. "Externality Assessments, Welfare Judgments, and Mechanism Design," EconStor Preprints 172494, ZBW - German National Library of Economics.

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