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Economic juries and public project provision

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  • McFadden, Daniel

Abstract

Juries charged with evaluating economic policy alternatives are the focus of this study. The recruitment and management of juries is a principal–agent problem involving the design of incentive mechanisms for participation and truthful revelation of values. This paper considers a simple general equilibrium economy in which juries of consumers are used to estimate the value of public projects and determine their provision. The impact of participation fees on jury selection and representativeness, and on statistical mitigation of response errors, is analyzed. Manski set identification is used to bound selection bias and determine participation fee treatments that minimize welfare regret from imperfect jury findings.

Suggested Citation

  • McFadden, Daniel, 2012. "Economic juries and public project provision," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 166(1), pages 116-126.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:econom:v:166:y:2012:i:1:p:116-126
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconom.2011.06.010
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Daniel McFadden, 2014. "The new science of pleasure: consumer choice behavior and the measurement of well-being," Chapters,in: Handbook of Choice Modelling, chapter 2, pages 7-48 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Stefan Hoderlein & Bettina Siflinger & Joachim Winter, 2015. "Identification of structural models in the presence of measurement error due to rounding in survey responses," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 869, Boston College Department of Economics.
    3. Daniel McFadden, 2017. "Foundations of Welfare Economics and Product Market Applications," NBER Working Papers 23535, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Daniel L. McFadden, 2013. "The New Science of Pleasure," NBER Working Papers 18687, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Set identification; Principal–agent problem; Juries; Welfare theory;

    JEL classification:

    • D00 - Microeconomics - - General - - - General
    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
    • C42 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Survey Methods
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

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