Bidding Behavior and Decision Costs in Field Experiments
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Other versions of this item:
- John A. List & David Lucking-Reiley, 2000. "Bidding Behavior and Decision Costs in Field Experiments," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0006, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- John List & David Lucking-Reiley, 2002. "Bidding behavior and decision costs in field experiments," Framed Field Experiments 00181, The Field Experiments Website.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Tenorio, Rafael, 1997. "On Strategic Quantity Bidding in Multiple Unit Auctions," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(2), pages 207-217, June.
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"Do Explicit Warnings Eliminate the Hypothetical Bias in Elicitation Procedures? Evidence from Field Auctions for Sportscards,"
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- John List & David Lucking-Reiley, 2000. "Demand reduction in a multi-unit auction: Evidence from a sportscard field experiment," Framed Field Experiments 00180, The Field Experiments Website.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Rolfe, John & Windle, Jill, 2006. "Using Field Experiments to Explore the Use of Multiple Bidding Rounds in Conservation Auctions," Discussion Papers 25801, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
- Kelly Shue & Erzo F. P. Luttmer, 2009.
"Who Misvotes? The Effect of Differential Cognition Costs on Election Outcomes,"
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy,
American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 229-257, February.
- Shue, Kelly & Luttmer, Erzo F. P., 2006. "Who Misvotes? The Effect of Differential Cognition Costs on Election Outcomes," Working Paper Series rwp06-048, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Shue, Kelly & Luttmer, Erzo F.P., 2006. "Who Misvotes? The Effect of Differential Cognition Costs on Election Outcomes," IZA Discussion Papers 2451, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Kelly Shue & Erzo F. P. Luttmer, 2006. "Who Misvotes? The Effect of Differential Cognition Costs on Election Outcomes," NBER Working Papers 12709, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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- John Rolfe & Jill Windle & Juliana McCosker, 2009. "Testing and Implementing the Use of Multiple Bidding Rounds in Conservation Auctions: A Case Study Application," Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie, Canadian Agricultural Economics Society/Societe canadienne d'agroeconomie, vol. 57(3), pages 287-303, September.
- Jennifer Brown & John Morgan, 2009.
"How Much Is a Dollar Worth? Tipping versus Equilibrium Coexistence on Competing Online Auction Sites,"
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University of Chicago Press, vol. 117(4), pages 668-700, August.
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- Daniel McFadden, 2009. "The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 13(1), pages 77-100, April.
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- Tukiainen, Janne, 2013. "Effects of minimum bid increment in internet auctions: Evidence from a field experiment," Working Papers 44, VATT Institute for Economic Research.
- Jannett Highfill & Kevin O’Brien, 2007. "Bidding and prices for online art auctions: sofa art or investment," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 31(4), pages 279-292, December.
- David Porter & Roumen Vragov, 2006. "An experimental examination of demand reduction in multi-unit versions of the Uniform-price, Vickrey, and English auctions," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(6), pages 445-458.
- Bresky, Michal, 2013.
"Revenue and efficiency in multi-unit uniform-price auctions,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 205-217.
- Michal Bresky, 2009. "Revenue and Efficiency in Multi-Unit Uniform-Price Auctions," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp384, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
- Rolfe, John & Windle, Jill, 2011. "Using auction mechanisms to reveal costs for water quality improvements in Great Barrier Reef catchments in Australia," Agricultural Water Management, Elsevier, vol. 98(4), pages 493-501, February.
- Axel Ockenfels & David Reiley & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 2006. "Online Auctions," NBER Working Papers 12785, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Anna Bassi & Kenneth C. Williams, 2014. "Examining Monotonicity and Saliency Using Level- k Reasoning in a Voting Game," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 5(1), pages 1-27, February.
- Amar Cheema & Dipankar Chakravarti & Atanu R. Sinha, 2012. "Bidding Behavior in Descending and Ascending Auctions," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 31(5), pages 779-800, September.
More about this item
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
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