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An Optimal Ad Valorem Tax/Subsidy with an Output-Based Refunded Emission Payment for Permits Auction in an Oligopoly Market

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  • Yuanguang Yu

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  • Yuanguang Yu, 2012. "An Optimal Ad Valorem Tax/Subsidy with an Output-Based Refunded Emission Payment for Permits Auction in an Oligopoly Market," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 52(2), pages 235-248, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:52:y:2012:i:2:p:235-248
    DOI: 10.1007/s10640-011-9526-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Susumu Cato, 2010. "Emission Taxes and Optimal Refunding Schemes with Endogenous Market Structure," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 46(3), pages 275-280, July.
    2. Fischer, Carolyn, 2011. "Market power and output-based refunding of environmental policy revenues," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 212-230, January.
    3. Karsten Neuhoff & Kim Keats Martinez & Misato Sato, 2006. "Allocation, incentives and distortions: the impact of EU ETS emissions allowance allocations to the electricity sector," Climate Policy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 6(1), pages 73-91, January.
    4. Sterner, Thomas & Hoglund Isaksson, Lena, 2006. "Refunded emission payments theory, distribution of costs, and Swedish experience of NOx abatement," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 93-106, April.
    5. Fredriksson, Per G. & Sterner, Thomas, 2005. "The political economy of refunded emissions payment programs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 113-119, April.
    6. Levin, Dan, 1985. "Taxation within Cournot oligopoly," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 281-290, August.
    7. Robert Wilson, 1979. "Auctions of Shares," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 93(4), pages 675-689.
    8. Sterner, Thomas & Muller, Adrian, 2006. "Output and Abatement Effects of Allocation Readjustment in Permit Trade," Discussion Papers dp-06-49, Resources For the Future.
    9. Lori Bennear & Robert Stavins, 2007. "Second-best theory and the use of multiple policy instruments," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 37(1), pages 111-129, May.
    10. John Pezzey, 1992. "The Symmetry between Controlling Pollution by Price and Controlling It by Quantity," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 25(4), pages 983-991, November.
    11. Fischer, Carolyn & Parry, Ian W. H. & Pizer, William A., 2003. "Instrument choice for environmental protection when technological innovation is endogenous," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 523-545, May.
    12. Gersbach, Hans & Requate, Till, 2004. "Emission taxes and optimal refunding schemes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 713-725, March.
    13. Barnett, A H, 1980. "The Pigouvian Tax Rule under Monopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(5), pages 1037-1041, December.
    14. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
    15. Montero, Juan-Pablo, 2002. "Permits, Standards, and Technology Innovation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 23-44, July.
    16. LiCalzi, Marco & Pavan, Alessandro, 2005. "Tilting the supply schedule to enhance competition in uniform-price auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 227-250, January.
    17. Katrin Millock & CĂ©line Nauges & Thomas Sterner, 2004. "Environmental Taxes: A Comparison of French and Swedish Experience from Taxes on Industrial Air Pollution," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 2(1), pages 30-34, 04.
    18. Shaffer, Sherrill, 1995. "Optimal Linear Taxation of Polluting Oligopolists," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 85-100, January.
    19. Ian Mackenzie & Nick Hanley & Tatiana Kornienko, 2008. "The optimal initial allocation of pollution permits: a relative performance approach," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 39(3), pages 265-282, March.
    20. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, March.
    21. Partha Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 2000. "Efficient Auctions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 115(2), pages 341-388.
    22. Cramton, Peter & Kerr, Suzi, 2002. "Tradeable carbon permit auctions: How and why to auction not grandfather," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 333-345, March.
    23. Lawrence M. Ausubel, 2004. "An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(5), pages 1452-1475, December.
    24. Lawrence H. Goulder & Ian W. H. Parry, 2008. "Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy," Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 2(2), pages 152-174, Summer.
    25. Ilan Kremer, 2004. "Underpricing and Market Power in Uniform Price Auctions," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 17(3), pages 849-877.
    26. Edward Clarke, 1971. "Multipart pricing of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 17-33, September.
    27. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-631, July.
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    29. Back, Kerry & Zender, Jaime F., 2001. "Auctions of divisible goods with endogenous supply," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 29-34, October.
    30. Back, Kerry & Zender, Jaime F, 1993. "Auctions of Divisible Goods: On the Rationale for the Treasury Experiment," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 6(4), pages 733-764.
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