The Political Economy of Refunded Emissions Payment Programs
Lobbying by pollution firms is commonly viewed as having a negative impact on the stringency of environmental policy. We ask whether lobbying instead can bring about stricter environmental policy, and how imperfect property rights affect the policy outcome. We study the effects on the equilibrium pollution tax of refunding all tax payments to the polluting firms. Relatively clean firms may be induced to lobby for a higher pollution levy. However, this incentive declines when the property rights over the accumulated funds are insecure.
|Date of creation:||07 Jan 2004|
|Publication status:||Published in Economic Letters, 2005, pages 113-119.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg, Box 640, SE 405 30 GÖTEBORG, Sweden|
Phone: 031-773 10 00
Web page: http://www.handels.gu.se/econ/
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