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Political uncertainty and the earmarking of environmental taxes

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  • Brett, Craig
  • Keen, Michael

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  • Brett, Craig & Keen, Michael, 2000. "Political uncertainty and the earmarking of environmental taxes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 315-340, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:75:y:2000:i:3:p:315-340
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Don Fullerton, 1996. "Why Have Separate Environmental Taxes?," NBER Chapters, in: Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 10, pages 33-70, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221.
    3. James M. Buchanan, 1963. "The Economics of Earmarked Taxes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 71, pages 457-457.
    4. Lawrence Goulder, 1995. "Environmental taxation and the double dividend: A reader's guide," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 2(2), pages 157-183, August.
    5. Torsten Persson & Lars E. O. Svensson, 1989. "Why a Stubborn Conservative would Run a Deficit: Policy with Time-Inconsistent Preferences," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 104(2), pages 325-345.
    6. McCleary, William, 1991. "The Earmarking of Government Revenue: A Review of Some World Bank Experience," The World Bank Research Observer, World Bank, vol. 6(1), pages 81-104, January.
    7. Coate, Stephen & Morris, Stephen, 1995. "On the Form of Transfers in Special Interests," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1210-1235, December.
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