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Rules transparency and political accountability

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  • Bordignon, Massimo
  • Minelli, Enrico

Abstract

Allocative and redistributive rules in the public sector are often less contingent on available information than normative theory would suggest. This paper offers a political economy explanation. Under different rules, even if the observable outcomes of policies remain the same, the informational content which can be extracted by these observations is different. Simpler rules are more transparent because they allow citizens to gain more information on politicians. Since there are limits to what voters can observe, this may be a relevant insight into the functioning of the political system.
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Suggested Citation

  • Bordignon, Massimo & Minelli, Enrico, 2001. "Rules transparency and political accountability," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 73-98, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:80:y:2001:i:1:p:73-98
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    1. repec:eee:poleco:v:49:y:2017:i:c:p:146-163 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Padovano, Fabio & Petrarca, Ilaria, 2014. "Are the responsibility and yardstick competition hypotheses mutually consistent?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 459-477.
    3. Maria Flavia Ambrosanio & Massimo Bordignon & Floriana Cerniglia, 2010. "Constitutional Reforms, Fiscal Decentralization and Regional Fiscal Flows in Italy," Chapters,in: The Political Economy of Inter-Regional Fiscal Flows, chapter 4 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    4. Massimo Bordignon, 2015. "Exit and Voice: Yardstick Versus Fiscal Competition Across Governments," Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, Springer;Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association), vol. 1(1), pages 117-137, March.
    5. Bordignon, Massimo & Grembi, Veronica & Piazza, Santino, 2017. "Who do you blame in local finance? An analysis of municipal financing in Italy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 146-163.
    6. Agnese Sacchi & Simone Salotti, 2017. "The influence of decentralized taxes and intergovernmental grants on local spending volatility," Regional Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 51(4), pages 507-522, April.
    7. Emanuele Bracco & Francesco Porcelli & Michela Redoano, 2013. "Political Competition, Tax Salience and Accountability: Theory and Some Evidence from Italy," CESifo Working Paper Series 4167, CESifo Group Munich.
    8. Bordignon, Massimo & Cerniglia, Floriana & Revelli, Federico, 2003. "In search of yardstick competition: a spatial analysis of Italian municipality property tax setting," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 199-217, September.
    9. Massimo Bordignon & Paolo Manasse & Guido Tabellini, 2001. "Optimal Regional Redistribution under Asymmetric Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 709-723, June.
    10. Bordignon, Massimo & Cerniglia, Floriana & Revelli, Federico, 2004. "Yardstick competition in intergovernmental relationships: theory and empirical predictions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 83(3), pages 325-333, June.
    11. Massimo Bordignon & Floriana Cerniglia & Federico Revelli, 2002. "In Search for Yardstick Competition: Property Tax Rates and Electoral Behavior in Italian Cities," CESifo Working Paper Series 644, CESifo Group Munich.
    12. Paolo Liberati & Agnese Sacchi, 2013. "Tax decentralization and local government size," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 157(1), pages 183-205, October.
    13. Canegrati, Emanuele, 2006. "Political Bad Reputation," MPRA Paper 1018, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Agnese Sacchi & Simone Salotti, 2016. "A Comprehensive Analysis of Expenditure Decentralization and of the Composition of Local Public Spending," Regional Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 50(1), pages 93-109, January.
    15. Maria Alessandra Antonelli, 2009. "Citizens' Information and the Size of Bureaucracy," Annals of the University of Petrosani, Economics, University of Petrosani, Romania, vol. 9(1), pages 17-26.
    16. Massimo Bordignon, 2000. "Problems of Soft Budget Constraints in Intergovernmental Relationships: The Case of Italy," Research Department Publications 3099, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    17. Canegrati, Emanuele, 2006. "Yardstick competition: a spatial voting model approach," MPRA Paper 1017, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Brender, Adi, 2003. "The effect of fiscal performance on local government election results in Israel: 1989-1998," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(9-10), pages 2187-2205, September.
    19. Sacchi, Agnese & Salotti, Simone, 2014. "The asymmetric nature of fiscal decentralization: theory and practice," MPRA Paper 54506, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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