IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ier/iecrev/v34y1993i3p685-703.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Political-Economy Arguments for a Uniform Tariff

Author

Listed:
  • Panagariya, Arvind
  • Rodrik, Dani

Abstract

We consider three political-economy arguments in favor of a uniform tariff rule (UTR). First, if tariffs are determined by lobbying, adoption of a UTR creates a free-rider problem. A tariff resulting from lobbying by one sector becomes available to all other sectors. This reduces incentive for lobbying. Second, if there are imported inputs which are used by import-competing sectors, a UTR leads to a lower level of lobbying. Finally, a UTR may tie the hands of a future government expected to favor certain sectors over others, and enhance welfare ex ante. None of these presents an air-tight case for uniformity. Copyright 1993 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

Suggested Citation

  • Panagariya, Arvind & Rodrik, Dani, 1993. "Political-Economy Arguments for a Uniform Tariff," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 34(3), pages 685-703, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:34:y:1993:i:3:p:685-703
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-6598%28199308%2934%3A3%3C685%3APAFAUT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-1&origin=repec
    File Function: full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Heinrich W. Ursprung, 1990. "Public Goods, Rent Dissipation, And Candidate Competition," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(2), pages 115-132, July.
    2. Richard E. Caves, 1976. "Economic Models of Political Choice: Canada's Tariff Structure," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 9(2), pages 278-300, May.
    3. W. M. Corden, 1958. "Import Restrictions And Triffs:A New Look At Australian Policy," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 34(69), pages 331-346, December.
    4. Brock, William A & Magee, Stephen P, 1978. "The Economics of Special Interest Politics: The Case of the Tariff," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(2), pages 246-250, May.
    5. Bhagwati, Jagdish N, 1982. "Directly Unproductive, Profit-seeking (DUP) Activities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(5), pages 988-1002, October.
    6. Magee,Stephen P. & Brock,William A. & Young,Leslie, 1989. "Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521377003, December.
    7. Rodrik, Dani, 1986. "Tariffs, subsidies, and welfare with endogenous policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3-4), pages 285-299, November.
    8. Mayer, Wolfgang, 1984. "Endogenous Tariff Formation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(5), pages 970-985, December.
    9. Panagariya, Arvind, 1990. "How should tariffs be structured?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 353, The World Bank.
    10. Schuknecht, Ludger & Ursprung, Heinrich W., 1990. "Die Anti-Dumping-Politik der EG und der USA: Ein Vergleich aus der Sicht der neuen politischen Ökonomie," Discussion Papers, Series II 98, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
    11. Panagariya, Arvind, 1992. "Input tariffs, duty drawbacks, and tariff reforms," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1-2), pages 131-147, February.
    12. Ronald Findlay & Stanislaw Wellisz, 1982. "Endogenous Tariffs, the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions, and Welfare," NBER Chapters, in: Import Competition and Response, pages 223-244, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Balassa, Bela, 1989. "Tariff policy and taxation in developing countries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 281, The World Bank.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:34:y:1993:i:3:p:685-703. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/deupaus.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.