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Die Anti-Dumping-Politik der EG und der USA: Ein Vergleich aus der Sicht der neuen politischen Ökonomie

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  • Schuknecht, Ludger
  • Ursprung, Heinrich W.

Abstract

Anti-Dumping Politik wird üblicherweise als nicht-politische Protektion angesehen. Diese Einschätzung beruht auf der US-amerikanischen Praxis, die stark, wenn auch nicht vollständig, technisch/administrativ ausgerichtet ist. Diese Arbeit untersucht, inwiefern die in den Vereingten Staaten gewonnenen Einsichten auf die AD-Politik der Europäischen Gemeinschaft übertragen werden können. Wir gelangen zum überraschenden Schluß, daß die AD-Entscheidungen der EG - institutionell bedingt - starken politischen Einflüssen ausgesetzt sind, während in den USA eben tendenziell technisch/administrative Faktoren dominieren. Im zweiten Teil der Arbeit untersuchen wir die Auswirkungen der beiden unterschiedlichen institutionellen Ausgestaltungen der AD-Politik auf die Höhe der Protektion. Da administrierte Protektion für die einzelnen importkonkurrenzierenden Wirtschaftszweige ein öffentliches Gut darstellt, politische Protektion jedoch ein privates Gut, ist es naheliegend, bei politischer Protektion ein höheres Protektionsniveau zu erwarten als bei administrierter Protektion. Wir zeigen jedoch, daß diese Schlußfolgerung nicht ohne weiteres aufrecht erhalten werden kann, wenn es den betroffenen ausländischen Interessen gelingt, den inländischen politischen Prozeß nachhaltig zu beeinflussen.

Suggested Citation

  • Schuknecht, Ludger & Ursprung, Heinrich W., 1990. "Die Anti-Dumping-Politik der EG und der USA: Ein Vergleich aus der Sicht der neuen politischen Ökonomie," Discussion Papers, Series II 98, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:kondp2:98
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rodrik, Dani, 1986. "Tariffs, subsidies, and welfare with endogenous policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3-4), pages 285-299, November.
    2. Schuknecht, Ludger, 1989. "The political economy of EC protectionism: National protectionism based on art. 115, treaty of Rome," Discussion Papers, Series II 81, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
    3. Hillman, Arye L. & Ursprung, Heinrich W., 1989. "The multinational firm and international trade policy," Discussion Papers, Series II 88, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
    4. Arye L. Hillman & Heinrich W. Ursprung, 2008. "Domestic Politics, Foreign Interests, and International Trade Policy," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Kai A. Konrad & Arye L. Hillman (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2, pages 113-129, Springer.
    5. Arye L. Hillman & Eliakim Katz, 1986. "Domestic Uncertainty and Foreign Dumping," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 19(3), pages 403-416, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Panagariya, Arvind & Rodrik, Dani, 1993. "Political-Economy Arguments for a Uniform Tariff," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 34(3), pages 685-703, August.
    2. Schuknecht, Ludger, 1991. "Dumping and antidumping in EC-CMEA trade," Discussion Papers, Series II 140, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
    3. Angelika Eymann & Ludger Schuknecht, 1996. "Antidumping Policy In The European Community: Political Discretion Or Technical Determination," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(2), pages 111-131, July.

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