Political Reform and Trade Policy
AbstractThe welfare effects of partial restrictions on political competition are investigated in a model in which two candidates receive campaign contributions from import-competing industries in return for tariff protection. Ceilings on allowable contributions per industry may be welfare-worsening, particularly if the "contributor elasticity" is high, because they induce candidates to seek additional contributors. Restrictions that reduce the number of industries allowed to contribute may also worsen welfare, because candidates respond by increasing contributions (and tariff protection) for each active contributor. The results suggest that the ability of candidates to circumvent partial restrictions may eliminate any potential benefits.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||1993|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: (319) 335-0829
Fax: (319) 335-1956
Web page: http://tippie.uiowa.edu/economics/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- repec:cup:cbooks:9780521377003 is not listed on IDEAS
- Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992.
"Protection for Sale,"
162, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
- Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1992. "Protection For Sale," NBER Working Papers 4149, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers 21-92, Tel Aviv.
- Grossman, Gene & Helpman, Elhanan, 1993. "Protection for Sale," CEPR Discussion Papers 827, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Hillman, Arye L & Ursprung, Heinrich W, 1988. "Domestic Politics, Foreign Interests, and International Trade Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 719-45, September.
- Wolfgang Mayer & Jun Li, 1994. "Interest Groups, Electoral Competition, And Probabilistic Voting For Trade Policies," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(1), pages 59-77, 03.
- Baron, David P, 1989. "Service-Induced Campaign Contributions and the Electoral Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(1), pages 45-72, February.
- John Douglas Wilson, 1990. "Are Efficiency Improvements In Government Transfer Policies Self-Defeating In Political Equilibrium?," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(3), pages 241-258, November.
- Mayer, Wolfgang, 1984. "Endogenous Tariff Formation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(5), pages 970-85, December.
- repec:cup:cbooks:9780521362474 is not listed on IDEAS
- Rodrik, Dani, 1986. "Tariffs, subsidies, and welfare with endogenous policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3-4), pages 285-299, November.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:uia:iowaec:93-09. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (John Solow)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.