Pay-to-Play Politics: Informational lobbying and campaign finance reform when contributions buy access
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 2008. "Rules of proof, courts, and incentives," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(1), pages 20-40.
- Andrea Prat, 2002. "Campaign Advertising and Voter Welfare," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(4), pages 999-1017.
- Arieh Gavious & Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela, 2002.
"Bid Costs and Endogenous Bid Caps,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(4), pages 709-722, Winter.
- Gavious, Arieh & Moldovanu, Benny & Sela, Aner, 2000. "Bid costs and endogenous bid caps," Papers 01-19, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
- Gavious, Arieh & Moldovanu, Benny & Sela, Aner, 2000. "Bid Costs and Endogenous Bid Caps," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 01-19, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
- Baye, Michael R & Kovenock, Dan & de Vries, Casper G, 1993.
"Rigging the Lobbying Process: An Application of the All-Pay Auction,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 289-294, March.
- Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1991. "Rigging The Lobbying Process: An Application Of The All- Pay Auction," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1002, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
- Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1992. "Rigging the Lobbying Process: An Application of the All- Pay Auction," Papers 9-92-2, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
- Cotton, Christopher, 2009.
"Should we tax or cap political contributions? A lobbying model with policy favors and access,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 93(7-8), pages 831-842, August.
- Christopher Cotton, 2008. "Should We Tax or Cap Political Contributions? A Lobbying Model with Policy Favors and Access," Working Papers 0901, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
- Raymond Riezman & John Douglas Wilson, 2013.
"Political Reform and Trade Policy,"
World Scientific Book Chapters,in: International Trade Agreements and Political Economy, chapter 13, pages 201-224
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Milyo Jeffrey & Primo David & Groseclose Timothy, 2000.
"Corporate PAC Campaign Contributions in Perspective,"
Business and Politics,
De Gruyter, vol. 2(1), pages 1-15, April.
- Milyo, Jeffrey & Primo, David & Groseclose, Timothy, 2000. "Corporate PAC Campaign Contributions in Perspective," Business and Politics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 2(01), pages 75-88, April.
- Morten Bennedsen & Sven E. Feldmann, 2002.
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(4), pages 919-948, August.
- Bennedsen, Morten & Feldmann, Sven E., 2000. "Lobbying Legislatures," Working Papers 07-2000, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics.
- Morten Bennedsen & Sven E. Feldmann, 2000. "Lobbying Legislatures," CIE Discussion Papers 2000-04, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
- Drazen, Allan & Limao, Nuno & Stratmann, Thomas, 2007.
"Political contribution caps and lobby formation: Theory and evidence,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 91(3-4), pages 723-754, April.
- Allan Drazen & Nuno Limão & Thomas Stratman, 2004. "Political Contribution Caps and Lobby Formation: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 10928, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bull, Jesse & Watson, Joel, 2004.
"Evidence disclosure and verifiability,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 1-31, September.
- Bull, Jesse & Watson, Joel, 2000. "Evidence Disclosure and Verifiability," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt6th0060j, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Bull, Jesse & Watson, Joel, 2002. "Evidence Disclosure and Verfiability," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt19p7z2gm, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Christopher S. Cotton & Arnaud Déllis, 2016.
"Informational Lobbying and Agenda Distortion,"
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization,
Oxford University Press, vol. 32(4), pages 762-793.
- Christopher Cotton & Arnaud Dellis, 2012. "Informational Lobbying and Agenda Distortion," Working Papers 2013-03, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
- Christopher Cotton & Arnaud Dellis, 2015. "Informational lobbying and agenda distortion," Working Papers 1348, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Raphael Boleslavsky & Christopher Cotton, 2018.
"Limited capacity in project selection: competition through evidence production,"
Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 65(2), pages 385-421, March.
- Raphael Boleslavsky & Christopher Cotton, 2015. "Limited Capacity in Project Selection: Competition Through Evidence Production," Working Papers 1343, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Christopher Cotton, 2013. "Competing for the Attention of Policymakers," Working Papers 2013-14, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
- Christopher Cotton & Cheng Li, 2016. "Clueless Politicians," Working Papers 1341, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Cotton, Christopher, 2015. "Competing for Attention," MPRA Paper 65715, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2016. "Overlobbying and Pareto-improving Agenda Constraint," School of Economics Working Papers 2016-05, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
More about this item
Keywordspolitical contributions; contribution limits; access; verifiable information disclosure;
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mia:wpaper:2010-22. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher Parmeter). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/demiaus.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.