Evidence Revelation in Competitions for Access
A decision maker must divide a resource between multiple agents. The decision maker prefers to award the resource to the most-qualified agents, but he is initially uncertain about agent qualifications. Although he can learn about qualifications by granting the agents “access (e.g., by taking time to review applications, hold inter- views, or conduct an investigation), he is time-constrained and cannot grant access to everyone. This paper considers how the decision maker should allocate the resource when agent qualifications are independent of their valuations; that is, when the optimal allocation cannot be achieved by selling the resource directly through an auction. We present a class of mechanisms in which the access is awarded through a competition in which higher payments (e.g., time, money) correspond to a greater likelihood of receiving access. After learning the qualifications of those agents with access, the deci- sion maker then chooses an allocation based on his updated beliefs. The analysis shows that there always exists competition for access mechanisms in which the decision maker becomes fully informed about the qualifications of all agents (even through only some of the agents reveal their qualifications through access). That is, the decision maker can always award access in such a way that he learns about and can implement his preferred resource allocation. When agents only differ in terms of their qualifications, a traditional all-pay auction is sufficient for full revelation.
|Date of creation:||Jul 2010|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Forthcoming: Working Paper|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: P.O. Box 248126, Coral Gables, FL 33124-6550|
Phone: (305) 284-5540
Fax: (305) 284-2985
Web page: http://www.bus.miami.edu/faculty-and-research/academic-departments/economics/index.html
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Bergemann, Dirk & Pesendorfer, Martin, 2007.
"Information structures in optimal auctions,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 580-609, November.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Pesendorfer, Martin, 2001. "Information Structures in Optimal Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 2991, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Dirk Bergemann & Martin Pesendorfer, 2001. "Information Structures in Optimal Auctions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1323, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Feess Eberhard & Muehlheusser Gerd & Walzl Markus, 2004.
050, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Lipman Barton L. & Seppi Duane J., 1995. "Robust Inference in Communication Games with Partial Provability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 370-405, August.
- Cotton, Christopher, 2009.
"Should we tax or cap political contributions? A lobbying model with policy favors and access,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 93(7-8), pages 831-842, August.
- Christopher Cotton, 2008. "Should We Tax or Cap Political Contributions? A Lobbying Model with Policy Favors and Access," Working Papers 0901, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
- Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1992.
"Rigging the Lobbying Process: An Application of the All- Pay Auction,"
9-92-2, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
- Baye, Michael R & Kovenock, Dan & de Vries, Casper G, 1993. "Rigging the Lobbying Process: An Application of the All-Pay Auction," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 289-94, March.
- Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1991. "Rigging The Lobbying Process: An Application Of The All- Pay Auction," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1002, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
- Bull, Jesse & Watson, Joel, 2002.
"Evidence Disclosure and Verfiability,"
University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series
qt19p7z2gm, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Bull, Jesse & Watson, Joel, 2000. "Evidence Disclosure and Verifiability," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt6th0060j, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Matthias Dahm & Nicolás Porteiro, 2006.
"Informational Lobbying under the Shadow of Political Pressure,"
06.14, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics.
- Matthias Dahm & Nicolás Porteiro, 2008. "Informational lobbying under the shadow of political pressure," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 30(4), pages 531-559, May.
- Matthias Dahm & Nicolas Porteiro, 2005. "Informational Lobbying under the Shadow of Political Pressure," Discussion Papers 1409, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Prat, Andrea, 1999.
"Campaign Advertising and Voter Welfare,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
2152, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- repec:oup:restud:v:74:y:2007:i:3:p:705-731 is not listed on IDEAS
- Daniel J. Seidmann & Eyal Winter, 1997. "Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(1), pages 163-170, January.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mia:wpaper:2010-21. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher Parmeter)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.