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Informational Lobbying and Agenda Distortion

Author

Listed:
  • Christopher S. Cotton
  • Arnaud Déllis

Abstract

This article challenges the prevailing view that pure informational lobbying (in the absence of political contributions and evidence distortion or withholding) leads to better informed policymaking. In the absence of lobbying, the policymaker (PM) may prioritize more promising issues. Recognizing this, interest groups involved with other issues have a greater incentive to lobby in order to change the issues that the PM learns about and prioritizes. We show how informational lobbying can be detrimental, in the sense that it can lead to less informed PMs and worse policy. This is because informational lobbying can lead to the prioritization of less important issues with active lobbies, and can crowd out information collection by the PM on issues with more likely beneficial reforms. The analysis fully characterizes the set of detrimental lobbying equilibria under two alternative types of issue asymmetry. (JEL D72, D78, D83)

Suggested Citation

  • Christopher S. Cotton & Arnaud Déllis, 2016. "Informational Lobbying and Agenda Distortion," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 32(4), pages 762-793.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:32:y:2016:i:4:p:762-793.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/jleo/eww005
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Stefano Barbieri & Kai A. Konrad & David A. Malueg, 2020. "Preemption contests between groups," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(3), pages 934-961, September.
    2. Schnakenberg, Keith & Turner, Ian R, 2023. "Formal Theories of Special Interest Influence," SocArXiv 47e26, Center for Open Science.
    3. Christopher J. Ellis & Thomas Groll, 2018. "Who Lobbies Whom? Special Interests and Hired Guns," CESifo Working Paper Series 7367, CESifo.
    4. Marco Catola, 2019. "Contribution and bribe: lobbying in presence of incumbent and bureaucrat," Discussion Papers 2019/247, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
    5. Cotton, Christopher, 2015. "Competing for Attention," Queen's Economics Department Working Papers 274670, Queen's University - Department of Economics.
    6. Li, Cheng & Xiao, Yancheng, 2020. "Persuasion, Spillovers, and Government Interventions," MPRA Paper 103500, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Amrita Kamalini Bhattacharyya & Vivekananda Mukherjee, 2019. "Lobbying and Bribery," Studies in Microeconomics, , vol. 7(2), pages 238-251, December.
    8. Bramoullé, Yann & Orset, Caroline, 2018. "Manufacturing doubt," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 119-133.
    9. Bellani, Luna & Fabella, Vigile Marie & Scervini, Francesco, 2020. "Strategic Compromise, Policy Bundling and Interest Group Power," IZA Discussion Papers 13924, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    10. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2020. "Subpoena power and informational lobbying," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(2), pages 188-234, April.
    11. Raphael Boleslavsky & Christopher Cotton, 2018. "Limited capacity in project selection: competition through evidence production," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 65(2), pages 385-421, March.
    12. Christopher Cotton, 2013. "Competing for the Attention of Policymakers," Working Papers 2013-14, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
    13. Rocco d`Este & Mirko Draca & Christian Fons-Rosen, 2020. "Shadow Lobbyists," Working Papers Series inetwp139, Institute for New Economic Thinking.
    14. Cheng Li, 2020. "Centralized policymaking and informational lobbying," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(4), pages 527-557, April.
    15. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2017. "Subpoena Power and Information Transmission," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2017-05, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
    16. David P Baron, 2019. "Lobbying dynamics," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 31(3), pages 403-452, July.
    17. Bellani, Luna & Fabella, Vigile Marie & Scervini, Francesco, 2023. "Strategic compromise, policy bundling and interest group power: Theory and evidence on education policy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    18. Christian Cox, 2023. "Lobbying for government appropriations," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 54(3), pages 443-483, September.
    19. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2016. "Overlobbying and Pareto-improving Agenda Constraint," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2016-05, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
    20. Dellis, Arnaud, 2023. "Legislative informational lobbying," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
    21. repec:osf:socarx:47e26_v1 is not listed on IDEAS
    22. Cotton, Christopher & Li, Cheng, 2016. "Clueless Politicians," Queen's Economics Department Working Papers 274667, Queen's University - Department of Economics.
    23. Ravi Radhakrishnan, 2022. "Public expenditure allocation, lobbying, and growth," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 24(4), pages 756-780, August.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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