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Preemption Contests Between Groups

Author

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  • Barbieri, Stefano
  • Konrad, Kai A.
  • Malueg, David A.

Abstract

We consider a preemption game between groups where the first agent to take a costly action wins the prize on behalf of his group. We describe the equilibrium solution of this problem when players differ in their own costs of action and these costs are private information. The equilibrium is typically characterized by delay. The nature of the equilibrium depends on key parameters such as the number of groups and their size. More competition between groups reduces delay, whereas in larger groups members of a given cost type are more reluctant to act but may yield an earlier resolution of the conflict. We analyze asymmetries across groups, focusing on group size and strength of the externalities within groups.

Suggested Citation

  • Barbieri, Stefano & Konrad, Kai A. & Malueg, David A., 2019. "Preemption Contests Between Groups," CEPR Discussion Papers 13738, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13738
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    Cited by:

    1. Kai A. Konrad & Florian Morath, 2020. "The Volunteer's Dilemma in Finite Populations," Working Papers 2020-34, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
    2. Kai A. Konrad & Florian Morath, 2021. "The volunteer’s dilemma in finite populations," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 31(4), pages 1277-1290, September.
    3. Stefano Barbieri & Kai A. Konrad, 2020. "Overzealous Rule Makers," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2020-11, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    dynamic conflict; free riding; incomplete information; inter-group conflict; preemption; waiting;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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