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The Good Samaritan and Traffic on the Road to Jericho

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  • Ted Bergstrom

Abstract

This paper studies a version of the Volunteer's Dilemma in which players sequentially observe someone in trouble and decide whether to help. Where preferences are identical, we show that if the frequency with which potential helpers appear is above some threshold, then as frequency of appearance increases, the probability that any individual stops diminishes, but the expected waiting time for help to appear is constant. Where costs of stopping differ among individuals, as the frequency of appearance increases, the expected waiting time for help to appear decreases, even though the probability that any individual stops diminishes.

Suggested Citation

  • Ted Bergstrom, 2017. "The Good Samaritan and Traffic on the Road to Jericho," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 33-53, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:9:y:2017:i:2:p:33-53
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.20150296
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mark Bagnoli & Ted Bergstrom, 2006. "Log-concave probability and its applications," Studies in Economic Theory, in: Charalambos D. Aliprantis & Rosa L. Matzkin & Daniel L. McFadden & James C. Moore & Nicholas C. Yann (ed.), Rationality and Equilibrium, pages 217-241, Springer.
    2. Xu, Xiaopeng, 2001. "Group size and the private supply of a best-shot public good," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 897-904, November.
    3. Jeroen Weesie, 1993. "Asymmetry and Timing in the Volunteer's Dilemma," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(3), pages 569-590, September.
    4. Robert Levine & Stephen Reysen & Ellen Ganz, 2008. "The kindness of strangers revisited: a comparison of 24 US cities," Social Indicators Research: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal for Quality-of-Life Measurement, Springer, vol. 85(3), pages 461-481, February.
    5. Jeroen Weesie, 1994. "Incomplete Information and Timing in the Volunteer's Dilemma," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 38(3), pages 557-585, September.
    6. Bliss, Christopher & Nalebuff, Barry, 1984. "Dragon-slaying and ballroom dancing: The private supply of a public good," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1-2), pages 1-12, November.
    7. Stefano Barbieri & David Malueg, 2014. "Group efforts when performance is determined by the “best shot”," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(2), pages 333-373, June.
    8. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1970. "Increasing risk: I. A definition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 225-243, September.
    9. Jeroen Weesie & Axel Franzen, 1998. "Cost Sharing in a Volunteer's Dilemma," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 42(5), pages 600-618, October.
    10. Joseph E Harrington Jr, 2001. "A Simple Game-Theoretic Explanation for the Relationship Between Group Size and Helping," Economics Working Paper Archive 417, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
    11. Ken Binmore, 1994. "Game Theory and the Social Contract, Volume 1: Playing Fair," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262023636, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Campos-Mercade, Pol, 2022. "When are groups less moral than individuals?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 20-36.
    2. Susanne Goldlücke & Thomas Tröger, 2018. "Assigning an unpleasant task without payment," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2018_003, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    3. Liu, Weifeng Larry & Sandler, Todd, 2024. "Public goods, group size, and provision aggregation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 223(C), pages 146-167.
    4. Stefano Barbieri & Kai A. Konrad & David A. Malueg, 2020. "Preemption contests between groups," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(3), pages 934-961, September.
    5. Campos-Mercade, Pol, 2021. "The volunteer’s dilemma explains the bystander effect," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 186(C), pages 646-661.
    6. Bergstrom, Ted & Garratt, Rodney & Leo, Greg, 2019. "Let me, or let George? Motives of competing altruists," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 269-283.
    7. Goldlücke, Susanne & Tröger, Thomas, 2020. "The multiple-volunteers principle," CEPR Discussion Papers 15580, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Goldlücke, Susanne & Tröger, Thomas, 2018. "Assigning an unpleasant task without payment," Working Papers 18-02, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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