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Taking turns

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  • Leo, Greg

Abstract

Two individuals face a regular task that requires the effort of only one. They take turns but sometimes arrange to swap obligations. These swaps account for their changing, private costs. While seemingly primitive, flexible turn-taking is surprisingly efficient, even relative to what can be achieved by mechanisms using monetary transfers. I model and experimentally evaluate a simple form of flexible turn-taking and then present a second form that is both consistent with patterns of subject behavior and approximately second-best in a benchmark case.

Suggested Citation

  • Leo, Greg, 2017. "Taking turns," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 525-547.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:102:y:2017:i:c:p:525-547
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.003
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    Cited by:

    1. Bergstrom, Ted & Garratt, Rod & Leo, Greg, 2015. "Let me, or Let George? Motives of competing altruists," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt48m9547q, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
    2. Bergstrom, Ted & Garratt, Rodney & Leo, Greg, 2019. "Let me, or let George? Motives of competing altruists," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 269-283.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Taking turns; Mechanism design; Ex post incentive compatibility; Repeated games;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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