IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Payment Schemes in Infinite-Horizon Experimental Games

  • Katerina Sherstyuk

    ()

    (Department of Economics, University of Hawaii at Manoa)

  • Nori Tarui

    ()

    (Department of Economics, University of Hawaii at Manoa)

  • Tatsuyoshi Saijo

    ()

    (Department of Economics, Osaka University)

We consider payment schemes in experiments that model infinite-horizon games by using random termination. We compare paying subjects cumulatively for all periods of the game; with paying subjects for the last period only; with paying for one of the periods, chosen randomly. Theoretically, assuming expected utility maximization and risk neutrality, both the Cumulative and the Last period payment schemes induce preferences that are equivalent to maximizing the discounted sum of utilities. The Last-period payment is also robust under different attitudes towards risk. In comparison, paying subjects for one of the periods chosen randomly creates a present period bias. We further provide experimental evidence from in nitely repeated Prisoners' Dilemma games that supports the above theoretical predictions.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.economics.hawaii.edu/research/workingpapers/WP_11-18.pdf
File Function: First version, 2011
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 201118.

as
in new window

Length: 46 pages
Date of creation: 01 Dec 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hai:wpaper:201118
Contact details of provider: Postal: 2424 Maile Way, Honolulu, HI 96822
Phone: (808)956-8730
Fax: (808)956-4347
Web page: http://www.economics.hawaii.edu/Email:


More information through EDIRC

Order Information: Web: http://www.economics.hawaii.edu/research/working.html Email:


References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Katerina Sherstyuk & Nori Tarui & Majah-Leah Ravago & Tatsuyoshi Saijo, 2011. "Payment schemes in random-termination experimental games," Working Papers 201102, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
  2. James C. Cox, 2009. "Some Issues of Methods, Theories, and Experimental Designs," Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series 2009-02, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
  3. Charles A. Holt & Susan K. Laury, 2002. "Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1644-1655, December.
  4. Aoyagi, Masaki & Fréchette, Guillaume, 2009. "Collusion as public monitoring becomes noisy: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1135-1165, May.
  5. John Duffy & Jack Ochs, 2004. "Cooperative Behavior and the Frequency of Social Interaction," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000108, UCLA Department of Economics.
  6. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, August.
  7. Robin Cubitt & Chris Starmer & Robert Sugden, 1998. "On the Validity of the Random Lottery Incentive System," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 115-131, September.
  8. Engle-Warnick, J. & Slonim, Robert L., 2006. "Learning to trust in indefinitely repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 95-114, January.
  9. Offerman, T.J.S. & Potters, J.J.M. & Verbon, H.A.A., 2001. "Cooperation in an overlapping generations experiment," Other publications TiSEM 879611c7-4050-4262-b6e9-6, School of Economics and Management.
  10. Charness, Gary B & Genicot, Garance, 2008. "Informal Risk Sharing in an Infinite-horizon Experiment," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt9sn8t91g, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
  11. Pedro Dal Bo & Guillaume R. Frochette, 2011. "The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(1), pages 411-29, February.
  12. Pedro Dal Bó, 2002. "Cooperation Under the Shadow of the Future: Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games," Working Papers 2002-20, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  13. repec:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-378701 is not listed on IDEAS
  14. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
  15. Rand, David G & Fudenberg, Drew & Dreber, Anna, 2012. "Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World," Scholarly Articles 11223697, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  16. Vivian Lei & Charles N. Noussair, 2002. "An Experimental Test of an Optimal Growth Model," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(3), pages 549-570, June.
  17. Holt, Charles A, 1986. "Preference Reversals and the Independence Axiom," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 508-15, June.
  18. Charness, Gary & Rabin, Matthew, 2002. "Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt3d04q5sm, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  19. Matthias Blonski & Peter Ockenfels & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2011. "Equilibrium Selection in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Axiomatic Approach and Experimental Evidence," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 164-92, August.
  20. Yan Chen & Sherry Xin Li, 2009. "Group Identity and Social Preferences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(1), pages 431-57, March.
  21. Jim Engle-Warnick & Robert L. Slonim, 2001. "Inferring Repeated Game Strategies From Actions: Evidence From Trust Game Experiments," Economics Papers 2001-W13, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
  22. Davis, Douglas D. & Holt, Charles a., 1993. "Experimental economics: Methods, problems and promise," Estudios Económicos, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos, vol. 8(2), pages 179-212.
  23. Starmer, Chris & Sugden, Robert, 1991. "Does the Random-Lottery Incentive System Elicit True Preferences? An Experimental Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 971-78, September.
  24. John Hey & Jinkwon Lee, 2005. "Do Subjects Separate (or Are They Sophisticated)?," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 233-265, September.
  25. repec:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-86814 is not listed on IDEAS
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hai:wpaper:201118. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Web Technician)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.