IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aejmic/v16y2024i3p199-231.html

Intelligence Disclosure and Cooperation in Repeated Interactions

Author

Listed:
  • Marco Lambrecht
  • Eugenio Proto
  • Aldo Rustichini
  • Andis Sofianos

Abstract

How does information about players' intelligence affect strategic behavior? Game theory, based on the assumption of common knowledge of rationality, does not provide useful predictions. We experimentally show that, in the Prisoner's Dilemma, disclosure hampers cooperation: higher-intelligence players trust their partners less when playing against someone of lower ability. Similarly, in the Battle of Sexes with low payoff inequality, disclosure disrupts coordination, as higher-intelligence players try to force their most preferred outcome. Instead, with higher payoff inequality, behavior changes and higher-intelligence players concede. We analyze the reasons for these patterns of behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Marco Lambrecht & Eugenio Proto & Aldo Rustichini & Andis Sofianos, 2024. "Intelligence Disclosure and Cooperation in Repeated Interactions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 16(3), pages 199-231, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:16:y:2024:i:3:p:199-231
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220245
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/mic.20220245
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://doi.org/10.3886/E183801V1
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/mic.20220245.appx
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/mic.20220245.ds
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1257/mic.20220245?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Alekseenko, Iuliia & Dagaev, Dmitry & Paklina, Sofiia & Parshakov, Petr, 2025. "Strategizing with AI: Insights from a beauty contest experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 240(C).
    2. Felix Kölle & Simone Quercia & Egon Tripodi, 2023. "Social Preferences under the Shadow of the Future," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 406, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    3. Piotr Evdokimov & Umberto Garfagnini, 2023. "Cognitive Ability and Perceived Disagreement in Learning," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 381, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    4. Porter, Maria & Nuhu, Ahmed Salim & Nakasone, Eduardo & Maredia, Mywish K., 2025. "Trust, risk, and institutions: experimental evidence from a community of firms in Kenya," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 110(C).
    5. Grandjean, Gilles & Lefebvre, Mathieu & Mantovani, Marco, 2022. "Preferences and strategic behavior in public goods games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 195(C), pages 171-185.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:16:y:2024:i:3:p:199-231. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Michael P. Albert (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/aeaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.