Preferences and strategic behavior in public goods games
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- Gilles Grandjean & Mathieu Lefebvre & Marco Mantovani, 2018. "Preferences and strategic behavior in public goods games," Working Papers of BETA 2018-47, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
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More about this item
KeywordsVoluntary contribution; conditional cooperation; free riding; strategic sophistication.;
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-CDM-2019-07-22 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EXP-2019-07-22 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2019-07-22 (Game Theory)
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