Cognitive Ability and Games of School Choice
We take school admission mechanisms to the lab to test whether the manipulable Boston mechanism disadvantages students of lower cognitive ability and whether this leads to ability segregation across schools. Results show this is the case: lower ability participants receive a lower average payoff and are over-represented at the worst school. Under the strategy-proof Deferred Acceptance mechanism, payoff differences between high and low ability participants are reduced, and distributions by ability across schools are harmonized. Hence, we find support for the argument that a move to strategy-proof mechanisms would â€œlevel the playing fieldâ€ . However, we document a trade-off between equality and efficiency in the choice of school admission mechanisms since average payoffs are larger under Boston than under Deferred Acceptance.
|Date of creation:||21 Jun 2016|
|Date of revision:||21 Jun 2016|
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- Christian Basteck & Marco Mantovani, 2016.
"Protecting unsophisticated applicants in school choice through information disclosure,"
WIDER Working Paper Series
065, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
- Christian, Basteck & Marco, Mantovani, 2016. "Protecting Unsophisticated Applicants in School Choice through Information Disclosure," Working Papers 342, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised 16 Jun 2016.
- Christian Basteck & Marco Mantovani, 2016. "Protecting Unsophisticated Applicants in School Choice through Information Disclosure," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2016-036, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
- Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sonmez, 2008. "Leveling the Playing Field: Sincere and Sophisticated Players in the Boston Mechanism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1636-1652, September.
- Calsamiglia, Caterina & Güell, Maia, 2014. "The Illusion of School Choice: Empirical Evidence from Barcelona," IZA Discussion Papers 8202, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Caterina Calsamiglia & Maia Güell, 2014. "The Illusion of School Choice: Empirical Evidence from Barcelona," Working Papers 810, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Calsamiglia, Caterina & Güell, Maia, 2014. "The Illusion of School Choice: Empirical Evidence from Barcelona," CEPR Discussion Papers 10011, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Caterina Calsamiglia & Maia G∏ell, 2014. "The Illusion of School Choice: Empirical Evidence from Barcelona," Studies on the Spanish Economy eee2014-15, FEDEA.
- Calsamiglia, Caterina & Guell, Maia, 2014. "The Illusion of School Choice: Empirical Evidence from Barcelona," Working Papers 712, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Yeon-Koo Che & Yosuke Yasuda, 2011. "Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice: The "Boston Mechanism" Reconsidered," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(1), pages 399-410, February.
- Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez, 2005. "The Boston Public School Match," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 368-371, May.
- SÃ¶nmez, Tayfun & Pathak, Parag A. & Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Roth, Alvin, 2005. "The Boston Public School Match," Scholarly Articles 2562764, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Caterina Calsamiglia & Francisco Martínez-Mora & Antonio Miralles, 2015. "School Choice Mechanisms, Peer Effects and Sorting," Discussion Papers in Economics 15/01, Department of Economics, University of Leicester. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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