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Christian Basteck

Personal Details

First Name:Christian
Middle Name:
Last Name:Basteck
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pba1594
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
http://ecares.ulb.ac.be/index.php?option=com_comprofiler&task=userProfile&user=365&Itemid=265

Affiliation

Abteilung "Verhalten auf Märkten"
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)

Berlin, Germany
http://www.wzb.eu/de/forschung/markt-und-entscheidung/verhalten-auf-maerkten
RePEc:edi:vawzbde (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Basteck, Christian & Mantovani, Marco, 2021. "Aiding applicants: Leveling the playing field within the immediate acceptance mechanism," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2021-203, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
  2. Christian Basteck & Bettina Klaus & Dorothea Kuebler, 2018. "How Lotteries in School Choice Help to Level the Playing Field," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 18.06, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
  3. Christian, Basteck & Marco, Mantovani, 2016. "Cognitive Ability and Games of School Choice," Working Papers 343, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised 21 Jun 2016.
  4. Basteck, Christian & Mantovani, Marco, 2016. "Protecting unsophisticated applicants in school choice through information disclosure," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2016-036, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
  5. Basteck, Christian & Mantovani, Marco, 2016. "Protecting unsophisticated applicants in school choice through information disclosure," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2016-036, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
  6. Basteck, Christian, 2014. "Fair and Efficient Lotteries over Indivisible Goods," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100517, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  7. Basteck, Christian & Daniëls, Tijmen R. & Heinemann, Frank, 2010. "Characterising equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2010-008, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
  8. Basteck, Christian & Daniëls, Tijmen R. & Heinemann, Frank, 2010. "Characterising equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2010-008, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
  9. Basteck, Christian & Daniëls, Tijmen R., 2010. "Every symmetric 3 x 3 global game of strategic complementarities is noise independent," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2010-061, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
  10. Basteck, Christian & Daniëls, Tijmen R., 2010. "Every symmetric 3 x 3 global game of strategic complementarities is noise independent," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2010-061, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
    repec:bdp:wpaper:2016001 is not listed on IDEAS
    repec:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2016-037 is not listed on IDEAS
    repec:bdp:wpaper:2016002 is not listed on IDEAS

Articles

  1. Basteck, Christian, 2022. "Characterising scoring rules by their solution in iteratively undominated strategies," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 74(1), pages 161-208.
  2. Basteck, Christian & Klaus, Bettina & Kübler, Dorothea, 2021. "How lotteries in school choice help to level the playing field," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 198-237.
  3. Basteck, Christian, 2018. "Fair solutions to the random assignment problem," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 163-172.
  4. Basteck, Christian & Mantovani, Marco, 2018. "Cognitive ability and games of school choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 156-183.
  5. Basteck, Christian & Daniëls, Tijmen R. & Heinemann, Frank, 2013. "Characterising equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2620-2637.
  6. Basteck, Christian & Daniëls, Tijmen R., 2011. "Every symmetric 3×3 global game of strategic complementarities has noise-independent selection," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(6), pages 749-754.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Basteck, Christian & Mantovani, Marco, 2021. "Aiding applicants: Leveling the playing field within the immediate acceptance mechanism," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2021-203, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.

    Cited by:

    1. Rustamdjan Hakimov & Dorothea Kübler, 2021. "Experiments on centralized school choice and college admissions: a survey," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(2), pages 434-488, June.

  2. Christian Basteck & Bettina Klaus & Dorothea Kuebler, 2018. "How Lotteries in School Choice Help to Level the Playing Field," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 18.06, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.

    Cited by:

    1. Ortega, Josué & Klein, Thilo, 2023. "The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 515-528.
    2. Rustamdjan Hakimov & Dorothea Kübler, 2021. "Experiments on centralized school choice and college admissions: a survey," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(2), pages 434-488, June.
    3. Elias Bouacida & Renaud Foucart, 2022. "Rituals of Reason," Working Papers 344119591, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
    4. Bouacida, Elias & Foucart, Renaud, 2025. "Rituals of reason: Experimental evidence on the social acceptability of lotteries in allocation problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 23-36.
    5. Schmidt, Robert J. & Trautmann, Stefan T., 2019. "Implementing (un)fair procedures? Favoritism and process fairness when inequality is inevitable," Working Papers 0661, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    6. Hakimov, Rustamdjan & Kübler, Dorothea, 2019. "Experiments on matching markets: A survey," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2019-205, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    7. Zhiyi Xu & Robert G. Hammond, 2024. "Designing school choice mechanisms: A structural model and demand estimation," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 62(2), pages 505-524, April.
    8. Zhang, Jun, 2021. "Level-k reasoning in school choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 1-17.
    9. Rustamdjan Hakimov & Dorothea Kübler & Siqi Pan, 2023. "Costly information acquisition in centralized matching markets," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(4), pages 1447-1490, November.
    10. Mennle, Timo & Seuken, Sven, 2021. "Partial strategyproofness: Relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
    11. Adam Kapor & Mohit Karnani & Christopher Neilson, 2019. "Negative Externalities of Off Platform Options and the Efficiency of Centralized Assignment Mechanisms," Working Papers 635, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..

  3. Christian, Basteck & Marco, Mantovani, 2016. "Cognitive Ability and Games of School Choice," Working Papers 343, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised 21 Jun 2016.

    Cited by:

    1. Ran I. Shorrer & Sandor Sovago, 2017. "Obvious Mistakes in a Strategically Simple College Admissions Environment," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 17-107/V, Tinbergen Institute.
    2. Basteck, Christian & Klaus, Bettina & Kübler, Dorothea, 2021. "How lotteries in school choice help to level the playing field," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 198-237.
    3. Hoyer, B. & Stroh-Maraun, N., 2020. "Matching strategies of heterogeneous agents under incomplete information in a university clearinghouse," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 453-481.
    4. Decerf, Benoit & Van der Linden, Martin, 2021. "Manipulability in school choice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    5. Hanaki, Nobuyuki & Hayashi, Takashi & Lombardi, Michele & Ogawa, Kazuhito, 2021. "Partial equilibrium mechanism and inter-sectoral coordination: An experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 190(C), pages 366-389.
    6. Nobuyuki Hanaki & Keigo Inukai & Takehito Masuda & Yuta Shimodaira, 2021. "Participants’ Characteristics at ISER-Lab in 2020," ISER Discussion Paper 1141, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka.
    7. André Schmelzer, 2018. "Strategy-Proofness of Stochastic Assignment Mechanisms," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 3(1), pages 17-50, December.
    8. Vincent Meisner & Jonas von Wangenheim, 2022. "Loss aversion in strategy-proof school-choice mechanisms," Papers 2207.14666, arXiv.org.
    9. Gilles, Grandjean & Mathieu, Lefebvre & Marco, Mantovani, 2018. "Preferences and strategic behavior in public goods games," Working Papers 395, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised 19 Dec 2018.
    10. Ha, Wei & Kang, Le & Song, Yang, 2020. "College matching mechanisms and matching stability: Evidence from a natural experiment in China," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 206-226.
    11. Parag A. Pathak & Alex Rees-Jones & Tayfun Sönmez, 2020. "Reversing Reserves," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 995, Boston College Department of Economics.
    12. Rustamdjan Hakimov & Dorothea Kübler, 2021. "Experiments on centralized school choice and college admissions: a survey," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(2), pages 434-488, June.
    13. Yoan Hermstrüwer, 2019. "Transparency and Fairness in School Choice Mechanisms," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics 2019_11, Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics.
    14. Basteck, Christian & Mantovani, Marco, 2021. "Aiding applicants: Leveling the playing field within the immediate acceptance mechanism," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2021-203, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    15. Hu, Xinquan & Yao, Lan, 2024. "Cognitive ability in matching with strategic uncertainty: An experimental study," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 88(C).
    16. König, Tobias & Mechtenberg, Lydia & Kübler, Dorothea & Schmacker, Renke, 2023. "Fairness in matching markets: Experimental evidence," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2023-204, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    17. Guillen, Pablo & Kesten, Onur & Kiefer, Alexander & Melatos, Mark, 2020. "Evaluating Advice in a Matching Mechanism with Experienced Participants: An Experimental Study of University Applicant Behaviour in Australia," Working Papers 2020-13, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
    18. Meisner, Vincent & von Wangenheim, Jonas, 2023. "Loss aversion in strategy-proof school-choice mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
    19. Alex Rees-Jones & Ran Shorrer & Chloe J. Tergiman, 2020. "Correlation Neglect in Student-to-School Matching," NBER Working Papers 26734, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Guillen, Pablo & Kesten, Onur & Kiefer, Alexander & Melatos, Mark, 2020. "A Field Evaluation of a Matching Mechanism: University Applicant Behaviour in Australia," Working Papers 2020-15, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
    21. Greg Leo & Jian Lou & Martin Van der Linden & Yevgeniy Vorobeychik & Myrna Wooders, 2021. "Matching soulmates," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(5), pages 822-857, October.
    22. Benoit Decerf, 2023. "A modification aimed at reducing the manipulability and inefficiency of the Boston school choice mechanism," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 60(1), pages 75-101, January.
    23. Luis Araujo & Leo Ferraris & Marco Mantovani & Daniela Puzzello, 2025. "Experimenting with Digital Currency," Working Papers 557, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics.
    24. Vincent Meisner & Jonas von Wangenheim, 2021. "School Choice and Loss Aversion," CESifo Working Paper Series 9479, CESifo.
    25. Avinatan Hassidim & Assaf Romm & Ran I. Shorrer, 2021. "The Limits of Incentives in Economic Matching Procedures," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(2), pages 951-963, February.
    26. Avinatan Hassidim & Déborah Marciano & Assaf Romm & Ran I. Shorrer, 2017. "The Mechanism Is Truthful, Why Aren't You?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(5), pages 220-224, May.
    27. Hakimov, Rustamdjan & Kübler, Dorothea, 2019. "Experiments on matching markets: A survey," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2019-205, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    28. Shorrer, Ran I. & Sóvágó, Sándor, 2024. "Dominated choices under deferred acceptance mechanism: The effect of admission selectivity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 167-182.
    29. Zhang, Jun, 2021. "Level-k reasoning in school choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 1-17.
    30. Klijn, Flip & Pais, Joana & Vorsatz, Marc, 2020. "Improving schools through school choice: An experimental study of deferred acceptance," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
    31. Calsamiglia, Caterina & Martínez-Mora, Francisco & Miralles, Antonio, 2020. "School Choice Design, Risk Aversion, and Cardinal Segregation," IZA Discussion Papers 13464, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    32. Sofianos, Andis, 2022. "Self-reported & revealed trust: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 88(C).
    33. Koutout, Kristine & Dustan, Andrew & Van der Linden, Martin & Wooders, Myrna, 2021. "Mechanism performance under strategy advice and sub-optimal play: A school choice experiment," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
    34. Ye, Xiaoyang & Zhai, Muxin & Feng, Li, 2025. "Free teacher education in rural China: Incentives and challenges11We thank Jesse Bruhn, Olivia Chi, Heather Hill, Brian Jacob, Susanna Loeb, David Monk, Emily Rauscher, Eric Taylor, and seminar partic," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
    35. Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz & Evdokimov, Piotr & Hakimov, Rustamdjan & Turhan, Bertan, 2022. "Parallel markets in school choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 181-201.
    36. Bellei, Cristián & Contreras, Mariana & Guajardo, Fabián, 2025. "Families' responses to a new centralized school admission system. School choice and justice in education," International Journal of Educational Development, Elsevier, vol. 113(C).

  4. Basteck, Christian & Mantovani, Marco, 2016. "Protecting unsophisticated applicants in school choice through information disclosure," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2016-036, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.

    Cited by:

    1. Christian, Basteck & Marco, Mantovani, 2016. "Cognitive Ability and Games of School Choice," Working Papers 343, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised 21 Jun 2016.
    2. Hanaki, Nobuyuki & Hayashi, Takashi & Lombardi, Michele & Ogawa, Kazuhito, 2021. "Partial equilibrium mechanism and inter-sectoral coordination: An experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 190(C), pages 366-389.
    3. Greg Leo & Jian Lou & Martin Van der Linden & Yevgeniy Vorobeychik & Myrna Wooders, 2021. "Matching soulmates," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(5), pages 822-857, October.

  5. Basteck, Christian & Mantovani, Marco, 2016. "Protecting unsophisticated applicants in school choice through information disclosure," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2016-036, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.

    Cited by:

    1. Christian, Basteck & Marco, Mantovani, 2016. "Cognitive Ability and Games of School Choice," Working Papers 343, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised 21 Jun 2016.
    2. Hanaki, Nobuyuki & Hayashi, Takashi & Lombardi, Michele & Ogawa, Kazuhito, 2021. "Partial equilibrium mechanism and inter-sectoral coordination: An experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 190(C), pages 366-389.
    3. Greg Leo & Jian Lou & Martin Van der Linden & Yevgeniy Vorobeychik & Myrna Wooders, 2021. "Matching soulmates," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(5), pages 822-857, October.

  6. Basteck, Christian & Daniëls, Tijmen R. & Heinemann, Frank, 2010. "Characterising equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2010-008, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.

    Cited by:

    1. Eric Hoffmann, 2013. "Global Games Selection in Games with Strategic Substitutes or Complements," WORKING PAPERS SERIES IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ECONOMICS 201308, University of Kansas, Department of Economics.
    2. Eric J. Hoffmann & Tarun Sabarwal, 2019. "Equilibrium existence in global games with general payoff structures," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(1), pages 105-115, May.
    3. Hoffmann, Eric & Sabarwal, Tarun, 2018. "Monotone Global Games," MPRA Paper 86943, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Zenou, Yves & Leister, Matthew & Zhou, Junjie, 2017. "Coordination on Networks," CEPR Discussion Papers 12392, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Stephen Morris & Daisuke Oyama & Satoru Takahashi, 2023. "Strict robustness to incomplete information," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 74(3), pages 357-376, July.
    6. Daisuke Oyama & Satoru Takahashi, 2011. "On the Relationship between Robustness to Incomplete Information and Noise-Independent Selection in Global Games," Working Papers 1324, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
    7. Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 2020. "Notes on “refinements and higher order beliefs”," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 71(1), pages 35-41, January.
    8. Iijima, Ryota, 2015. "Iterated generalized half-dominance and global game selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 120-136.
    9. Harrison, Rodrigo & Jara-Moroni, Pedro, 2015. "A dominance solvable global game with strategic substitutes," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 1-11.
    10. Hoffmann, Eric J. & Sabarwal, Tarun, 2019. "Global games with strategic complements and substitutes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 72-93.

  7. Basteck, Christian & Daniëls, Tijmen R. & Heinemann, Frank, 2010. "Characterising equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2010-008, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.

    Cited by:

    1. Eric Hoffmann, 2013. "Global Games Selection in Games with Strategic Substitutes or Complements," WORKING PAPERS SERIES IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ECONOMICS 201308, University of Kansas, Department of Economics.
    2. Eric J. Hoffmann & Tarun Sabarwal, 2019. "Equilibrium existence in global games with general payoff structures," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(1), pages 105-115, May.
    3. Basteck, Christian & Daniëls, Tijmen R., 2010. "Every symmetric 3 x 3 global game of strategic complementarities is noise independent," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2010-061, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
    4. Fiocco, Raffaele, 2010. "The optimal industry structure in a vertically related market," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2010-024, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
    5. Hoffmann, Eric & Sabarwal, Tarun, 2018. "Monotone Global Games," MPRA Paper 86943, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Rodrigo Harrison & Pedro Jara‐Moroni, 2021. "Global Games With Strategic Substitutes," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 62(1), pages 141-173, February.
    7. Baranovski, Alexander L., 2010. "Dynamical systems forced by shot noise as a new paradigm in the interest rate modeling," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2010-037, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
    8. Zenou, Yves & Leister, Matthew & Zhou, Junjie, 2017. "Coordination on Networks," CEPR Discussion Papers 12392, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Stephen Morris & Daisuke Oyama & Satoru Takahashi, 2023. "Strict robustness to incomplete information," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 74(3), pages 357-376, July.
    10. Panov, Vladimir, 2010. "Non-gaussian component analysis: New ideas, new proofs, new applications," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2010-026, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
    11. Eric J. Hoffmann & Tarun Sabarwal, 2019. "Global Games With Strategic Complements and Substitutes," WORKING PAPERS SERIES IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ECONOMICS 201908, University of Kansas, Department of Economics.
    12. Marion Oury, 2012. "Noise-Independent Selection in Multidimensional Global Games," Thema Working Papers 2012-28, THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS.
    13. Honda, Jun, 2011. "Noise-independent selection in global games and monotone potential maximizer: A symmetric 3×3 example," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(6), pages 663-669.
    14. Daisuke Oyama & Satoru Takahashi, 2011. "On the Relationship between Robustness to Incomplete Information and Noise-Independent Selection in Global Games," Working Papers 1324, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
    15. Härdle, Wolfgang Karl & Moro, Rouslan A. & Hoffmann, Linda, 2010. "Learning machines supporting bankruptcy prediction," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2010-032, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
    16. Daniëls, Tijmen R. & Dönges, Jutta & Heinemann, Frank, 2013. "Crossing network versus dealer market: Unique equilibrium in the allocation of order flow," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 41-57.
    17. Panov, Vladimir, 2010. "Estimation of the signal subspace without estimation of the inverse covariance matrix," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2010-050, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
    18. Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 2020. "Notes on “refinements and higher order beliefs”," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 71(1), pages 35-41, January.
    19. Iijima, Ryota, 2015. "Iterated generalized half-dominance and global game selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 120-136.
    20. Harrison, Rodrigo & Jara-Moroni, Pedro, 2015. "A dominance solvable global game with strategic substitutes," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 1-11.
    21. Janek, Agnieszka & Kluge, Tino & Weron, Rafał & Wystup, Uwe, 2010. "FX smile in the Heston model," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2010-047, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
    22. Sabiwalsky, Ralf, 2010. "Executive compensation regulation and the dynamics of the pay-performance sensitivity," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2010-051, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
    23. Basteck, Christian & Daniëls, Tijmen R. & Heinemann, Frank, 2013. "Characterising equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2620-2637.
    24. Basteck, Christian & Daniëls, Tijmen R., 2011. "Every symmetric 3×3 global game of strategic complementarities has noise-independent selection," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(6), pages 749-754.

  8. Basteck, Christian & Daniëls, Tijmen R., 2010. "Every symmetric 3 x 3 global game of strategic complementarities is noise independent," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2010-061, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.

    Cited by:

    1. Honda, Jun, 2011. "Noise-independent selection in global games and monotone potential maximizer: A symmetric 3×3 example," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(6), pages 663-669.
    2. Daisuke Oyama & Satoru Takahashi, 2011. "On the Relationship between Robustness to Incomplete Information and Noise-Independent Selection in Global Games," Working Papers 1324, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
    3. Oury, Marion, 2013. "Noise-independent selection in multidimensional global games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2638-2665.

Articles

  1. Basteck, Christian & Klaus, Bettina & Kübler, Dorothea, 2021. "How lotteries in school choice help to level the playing field," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 198-237.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Basteck, Christian, 2018. "Fair solutions to the random assignment problem," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 163-172.

    Cited by:

    1. Jingsheng Yu & Jun Zhang, 2025. "The core in the housing market model with fractional endowments," Papers 2508.11151, arXiv.org.
    2. Basteck, Christian & Ehlers, Lars, 2023. "Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).
    3. Basteck, Christian & Ehlers, Lars H., 2022. "Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2022-208, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    4. Shende, Priyanka & Purohit, Manish, 2023. "Strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms for house allocation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
    5. Rasoul Ramezanian & Mehdi Feizi, 2021. "Ex-post favoring ranks: a fairness notion for the random assignment problem," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 25(3), pages 157-176, September.
    6. Jingsheng Yu & Jun Zhang, 2020. "Efficient and fair trading mechanisms for resource exchange in market design," Papers 2005.06878, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2025.
    7. Conal Duddy, 2025. "Egalitarian random assignment," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 80(1), pages 321-354, August.

  3. Basteck, Christian & Mantovani, Marco, 2018. "Cognitive ability and games of school choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 156-183.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Basteck, Christian & Daniëls, Tijmen R. & Heinemann, Frank, 2013. "Characterising equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2620-2637.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  5. Basteck, Christian & Daniëls, Tijmen R., 2011. "Every symmetric 3×3 global game of strategic complementarities has noise-independent selection," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(6), pages 749-754.

    Cited by:

    1. Jun Honda, 2018. "Games with the total bandwagon property meet the Quint–Shubik conjecture," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(3), pages 893-912, September.
    2. Rodrigo Harrison & Pedro Jara‐Moroni, 2021. "Global Games With Strategic Substitutes," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 62(1), pages 141-173, February.
    3. Honda, Jun, 2015. "Games with the Total Bandwagon Property," Department of Economics Working Paper Series 197, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business.
    4. Stephen Morris & Daisuke Oyama & Satoru Takahashi, 2023. "Strict robustness to incomplete information," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 74(3), pages 357-376, July.
    5. Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 2020. "Notes on “refinements and higher order beliefs”," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 71(1), pages 35-41, January.
    6. Harrison, Rodrigo & Jara-Moroni, Pedro, 2015. "A dominance solvable global game with strategic substitutes," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 1-11.
    7. Daisuke Oyama & Satoru Takahashi, 2020. "Generalized Belief Operator and Robustness in Binary‐Action Supermodular Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(2), pages 693-726, March.
    8. Oyama, Daisuke & Takahashi, Satoru, 2015. "Contagion and uninvadability in local interaction games: The bilingual game and general supermodular games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 100-127.
    9. Basteck, Christian & Daniëls, Tijmen R. & Heinemann, Frank, 2013. "Characterising equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2620-2637.
    10. Oyama, Daisuke & Takahashi, Satoru, 2011. "On the relationship between robustness to incomplete information and noise-independent selection in global games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(6), pages 683-688.

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Statistics

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 15 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (10) 2016-07-02 2016-07-02 2016-10-09 2016-10-09 2018-09-10 2018-09-10 2018-11-19 2019-12-16 2021-06-28 2022-01-10. Author is listed
  2. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (9) 2010-01-30 2011-01-03 2015-02-22 2016-01-29 2016-03-10 2016-07-02 2016-07-02 2016-10-09 2016-10-09. Author is listed
  3. NEP-URE: Urban and Real Estate Economics (8) 2016-07-02 2016-10-09 2016-10-09 2018-09-10 2018-11-19 2019-12-16 2021-06-28 2022-01-10. Author is listed
  4. NEP-DES: Economic Design (5) 2018-09-10 2018-11-19 2019-12-16 2021-06-28 2022-01-10. Author is listed
  5. NEP-EDU: Education (5) 2016-07-02 2016-07-02 2016-10-09 2016-10-09 2021-06-28. Author is listed
  6. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (2) 2016-01-29 2016-03-10
  7. NEP-NEU: Neuroeconomics (2) 2016-07-02 2016-10-09
  8. NEP-CBE: Cognitive and Behavioural Economics (1) 2016-07-02
  9. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (1) 2016-03-10
  10. NEP-EVO: Evolutionary Economics (1) 2010-01-30
  11. NEP-HPE: History and Philosophy of Economics (1) 2011-01-03
  12. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (1) 2016-03-10

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