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Noise-Independent Selection in Multidimensional Global Games


  • Marion Oury

    () (THEMA, Universite de Cergy-Pontoise)


This paper examines many-player many-action global games with multidimensional state parameters. It establishes that the notion of noise-independent selection introduced by Frankel, Morris and Pauzner (Journal of Economic Theory 108 (2003) 1- 44) for onedimensional global games is robust when the setting is extended to the one proposed by Carlsson and Van Damme (Econometrica, 61, 989-1018). More precisely, our main result states that if an action pro le of some complete information game is noise-independently selected in some one-dimensional global game, then it is also noise-independently selected in all multidimensional global games.

Suggested Citation

  • Marion Oury, 2012. "Noise-Independent Selection in Multidimensional Global Games," THEMA Working Papers 2012-28, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  • Handle: RePEc:ema:worpap:2012-28

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Oyama, Daisuke & Tercieux, Olivier, 2009. "Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1726-1769, July.
    2. Frankel, David M. & Morris, Stephen & Pauzner, Ady, 2003. "Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 1-44, January.
    3. Carlsson, Hans & van Damme, Eric, 1993. "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 989-1018, September.
    4. Oyama, Daisuke & Takahashi, Satoru, 2011. "On the relationship between robustness to incomplete information and noise-independent selection in global games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(6), pages 683-688.
    5. Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 1997. "The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(6), pages 1283-1310, November.
    6. Basteck, Christian & Daniëls, Tijmen R. & Heinemann, Frank, 2013. "Characterising equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2620-2637.
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    More about this item


    equilibrium selection; global games; strategic complementarities; robustness.;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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