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Report NEP-DES-2021-06-28
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Kyle Greenberg & Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez, 2020, "Mechanism Design meets Priority Design: Redesigning the US Army’s Branching Process Through Market Design," Boston College Working Papers in Economics, Boston College Department of Economics, number 1035, Jun.
- Gregory Z. Gutin & Philip R. Neary & Anders Yeo, 2021, "Unique Stable Matchings," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2106.12977, Jun, revised Jul 2023.
- Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn, 2021, "Minimal-Access Rights in School Choice and the Deferred Acceptance Mechanism," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie, number 21.11, Jun.
- Di Feng & Bettina Klaus, 2021, "Preference revelation games and strict cores of multiple-type housing market problems," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie, number 21.10, Jun.
- Author-Name: Christian Basteck & Author-Name: Bettina Klaus & Dorothea Kuebler, 2021, "How Lotteries in School Choice Help to Level the Playing Field," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie, number 21.09, Jun.
- Alfred Galichon & Bernard Salani'e, 2021, "Cupid's Invisible Hand: Social Surplus and Identification in Matching Models," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2106.02371, Jun, revised Jan 2023.
- Margarita Kirneva & Matias Nunez, 2021, "Voting by Simultaneous Vetoes," Working Papers, HAL, number halshs-03240630, May.