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Preferences and strategic behavior in public goods games

Author

Listed:
  • Gilles Grandjean

    (CEREC - Centre de recherche en économie - Université Saint-Louis - Bruxelles)

  • Mathieu Lefebvre

    (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Marco Mantovani

    (UNIMI - Università degli Studi di Milano = University of Milan, UNIMIB - Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca = University of Milano-Bicocca)

Abstract

In finitely repeated public goods games, contributions are initially high, and gradually decrease over time. Two main explanations are consistent with this pattern: (i) the population is composed of free-riders, who never contribute, and conditional cooperators, who contribute if others do so as well; (ii) strategic players contribute to sustain mutually beneficial future cooperation, but reduce their contributions as the end of the game approaches. This paper analyzes experimentally these explanations, by manipulating group composition to form homogeneous groups on both the preference and the strategic ability dimensions. Our results highlight the role of strategic ability in sustaining contributions, and suggest that the interaction between the two dimensions also matters: we find that groups that sustain high levels of cooperation are composed of members who share a common inclination toward cooperation and also have the strategic abilities to recognize and reap the benefits of enduring cooperation.

Suggested Citation

  • Gilles Grandjean & Mathieu Lefebvre & Marco Mantovani, 2022. "Preferences and strategic behavior in public goods games," Post-Print hal-03547809, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03547809
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2022.01.007
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://amu.hal.science/hal-03547809
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    Cited by:

    1. Maho Nakagawa & Mathieu Lefebvre & Anne Stenger, 2022. "Long-lasting effects of incentives and social preference: A public goods experiment," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 17(8), pages 1-24, August.
    2. Luis Araujo & Leo Ferraris & Marco Mantovani & Daniela Puzzello, 2025. "Experimenting with Digital Currency," Working Papers 557, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior

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