The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism
We consider truthful implementation of the socially efficient allocation in an independent private-value environment in which agents receive private information over time. We propose a suitable generalization of the pivot mechanism, based on the marginal contribution of each agent. In the dynamic pivot mechanism, the ex-post incentive and ex-post participation constraints are satisfied for all agents after all histories. In an environment with diverse preferences it is the unique mechanism satisfying ex-post incentive, ex-post participation and efficient exit conditions. We develop the dynamic pivot mechanism in detail for a repeated auction of a single object in which each bidder learns over time her true valuation of the object. The dynamic pivot mechanism here is equivalent to a modified second price auction.
|Date of creation:||Aug 2008|
|Date of revision:||Dec 2009|
|Publication status:||Published in Econometrica (March 2010), 78(2): 771-789|
|Note:||CFP 1293, includes supplement|
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