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Guilt in voting and public good games

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  • Rothenhäusler, Dominik
  • Schweizer, Nikolaus
  • Szech, Nora

Abstract

This paper analyzes how moral costs affect individual support of morally difficult group decisions. We study a threshold public good game with moral costs. Motivated by recent empirical findings, we assume that these costs are heterogeneous and consist of three parts. The first one is a standard cost term. The second, shared guilt, decreases in the number of supporters. The third hinges on the notion of being pivotal. We analyze equilibrium predictions, isolate the causal effects of guilt sharing, and compare results to standard utilitarian and non-consequentialist approaches. As interventions, we study information release, feedback, and fostering individual moral standards.

Suggested Citation

  • Rothenhäusler, Dominik & Schweizer, Nikolaus & Szech, Nora, 2016. "Guilt in voting and public good games," Working Paper Series in Economics 99, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:kitwps:99
    DOI: 10.5445/IR/1000068503
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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